



Logic and Religion in Wŏnhyo's Buddhism: Focusing on Wŏnhyo's Critical Discussions on Inference

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Logic and Religion in Wŏnhyo's Buddhism: Focusing on Wŏnhyo's *Critical Discussions on Inference*

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Abstract

In my reflections about logic and religion in Wŏnhyo's Buddhism, I presuppose that there exist logical laws normatively valid for all human beings. My analyses then focus on the question of whether Wŏnhyo held that in, and because of, certain Buddhist teachings, some such laws as for instance the Principle of non-contradiction need not be accepted. Answering this question in the negative, I argue that Wŏnhyo, in spite of being a devout Buddhist, uncompromisingly rejected logical inconsistencies, thus comparing favorably to many medieval Christian scholastics. In particular, I deal with Wŏnhyo's use of "skillful means" (upāya) as a device to avoid contradiction. However, I also admit that important questions remain open, and I try to make it clear that, from a methodological point of view, skillful means is a rather dubious tool to solve logical problems.

Key words: Wŏnhyo, universal logic, law of non-contradiction, religious logic, skillful means

My Basic Interests and Convictions

It may facilitate understanding of what I am going to say when I first state some of my basic scholarly interests and convictions. I am mainly interested in questions of validity, thereby of course taking into account philological and historical presuppositions. As to my convictions, I am convinced that there exist a “universal logic”—logical principles *normatively valid for all human beings*, among them the principles of identity, non-contradiction, transitivity, and, yes, the excluded middle. I have argued for these convictions in several publications, for instance in the Lumbini volume, *Logic in Buddhist Scholasticism* (2015). As a matter of consequence, I oppose logical relativism, particularly logical relativism grounded in cultural relativism, and I also reject what has been called “religious logic,” i.e. theories of logic which, because of certain religious beliefs, deny the universal validity of such principles as the principles of identity and non-contradiction.¹ Let me indicate only two arguments for my position that there exists a universal logic: First, imagine two cultures acknowledging and using somehow incompatible but equally valid logical principles. Then people of these cultures would usually arrive at different conclusions even when agreeing on the respective premises or presuppositions. Even mathematical understanding would be impossible. Second, no human being can avoid using the named principles, be it only on a certain meta-level of reflection.

Religious or Sacred Teachings and Logicalness in Medieval Christian Scholasticism and in Wōnhyo

Albertus Magnus, Albert the Great (c. 1200–1280), once stated that because of “the certainty of belief” (which is “more certain than the certainty of any scientific teaching and demonstration”), a true Christian who has mastered mathematics would rather dispense with the principle “that the sum of the three angles of a triangle equals [the sum of] two right angles than to deny the truth of [the Christian] faith” (Albertus Magnus 2012, 231–233).²

This statement testifies to a position widespread among medieval Christian logicians, namely that contradictory divine revelation is superior to—or overrules—even logically consistent scientific truth, not to mention what may

be called everyday truths. Often such standpoint is seen as characteristic of the medieval concept of “two truths.” Of course, this position must not be confused with Buddhist notions of two truths, although there is a striking similarity with regard to the hierarchy of the two truths.

Wōnhyo concludes his *Critical Discussion on Inference* (*P'an piryang non* 判比量論) by stating:

證成道理甚難思/ 自非笑却微易解/ 今依聖典舉一隅/ 願通佛道流二世

Logical proofs are extremely difficult to comprehend,
So I laugh; what seemed so abstruse is easy to understand!
Now, relying on the sacred teaching, I raise one corner [of the whole],
May Buddha Dharma circulate through this world and the next.³

Does this mean that one should not use logic as a means of understanding Buddhist teachings? For logic is too difficult in reaching this goal? That it would be better to simply rely on “the sacred teachings,” i.e. on pure faith? After all, Wōnhyo, in a statement relevant to such questions says: 只應仰信·不可比量. Muller translates: “One should just have faith, because it [the non-conceptual “incomparable, unequalled, unsurpassed supreme” truth] cannot be apprehended through reason.”⁴ But Muller also translates: “One *can* only have faith, because it cannot be apprehended *logically*” (WSW, 29).⁵ Having faith, comprehension of even only a small part of the teachings would easily enable one to comprehend the whole. However, what does “difficult” precisely mean? And what about the inferences included in some “sacred texts?” Most importantly, does Wōnhyo want to imply that one should rely “on the sacred teachings” (and just have faith) even when these teachings are logically inconsistent? In other words, did Wōnhyo hold that there exists a kind of logic which, because of one’s religious belief, contradicts universal logic?

If he indeed had implied this, he would have fallen back behind the position that only teachings free of contradictions are acceptable or tenable—a position already held by Asaṅga and Dignāga (cf. WPM, 362–363, note 10; 366–367, note 38). I agree with the “General Introduction” to WPM (pp. 27–28) that this was not the case. Also, Wōnhyo’s *Critical Discussion on Inference* (hereafter *Critical Discussion*) seems to make it clear that he regarded logical consistency a necessary condition for every kind of validity, for in this treatise he without

exception dismisses contradictory propositions and inferences as untenable. Moreover, his impressive understanding of logical questions and principles, his logical acumen, so to say, makes it highly improbable that he did not recognize the necessity of logical correctness. To explicitly state this, may be of no relevance for historians and philologists not interested in questions of universal validity, but it is important from transcultural points of view. For, in the so-called West, there still exists the prejudice that Eastern thought, and especially Daoism and Buddhism, are significantly illogical, and that Eastern thought, *precisely because of this fact*, offers a viable alternative to what is then (erroneously) conceived as Western logo-centrism. Even most Western philosophers who are interested in transcultural studies do not even know of the existence of the “Science of reasons” (*hetuvidyā/yinming/inmyō/inmyōng*).

Now, the hypothesis that Wōnhyo did not accept logically inconsistent teachings is not easily reconciled with what he says in the quoted stanza and about faith. At least, the hypothesis needs qualification. For, if just relying on faith means believing in the sacred teachings without caring about logic (for logic would be unable to reach relevant or soteriological understanding), Wōnhyo's own logical analyses of sacred teachings would have been pointless, or the understanding gained by such analyses would differ significantly from an understanding of the “incomparable, unequalled, unsurpassed supreme” truth of Buddhism (which is ultimately relevant). In other words, one should be aware that Wōnhyo, like other scholastics, distinguished between conceptualized and non-conceptualized truths. Thereby he insisted that conceptualized truth ought to be logically consistent while, with regard to the question of logicalness, in his view, nothing can and should be said about non-conceptualized truth which, anyway, could not be expressed in words.⁶

But even when taking this distinction into account, some problems remain. In his *Critical Discussion*, Wōnhyo tries to show that it is not so easy to logically prove the existence of the Pure Land, and in his *Doctrinal Essentials of the Sūtra of Immeasurable Life* he seems to accept all the fantastic features and miracles of the Pure Land described in the Sūtra, thus displaying complete belief in the truth of this scripture. For instance, he says:

In the jeweled forest fragrant winds always waft pleasantly warm and cool, and no one has ever suffered from the winter cold or summer heat. When the crowds of sages gather to meet, they bathe in the lotus pond of the eight

attributes. From this they have long avoided ugly white hair and wrinkles. Excellent companions follow one another, coursing multiple times in the Buddha-lands of the ten directions. Here they are greatly removed from their inconsolable pain and suffering. (WSW, 144)

Or, referring to two different theories about the origins of the Pure Land, he asks the rhetorical question:

皆依聖典·有何不實.

Since both are based on scriptural authority, how could either one be inaccurate? (WSW, 174)

Do such passages imply that Wōnhyo held that faith *overrides* logic? Probably not. One could perhaps argue that Wōnhyo's words must not be taken literally. He mixes poetical formulations, metaphors, paradoxes, quotations, and logical reflections. Perhaps, he even employs irony.⁷ But he also uses such carefully worded logically consistent expressions as “Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are, in the end, not two *realms*” (生死涅槃終無二際) [WSW, 141, italics mine]. His distinction between conceptional and non-conceptional knowledge and his views on the Two Truths and *upāya* (skillful means) play a role.⁸ Based on and applying his notion of *upāya*, Wōnhyo could have rightly claimed that many of the apparent contradictions in and between the sacred texts could be, and ought to be, understood differently, namely, as parts of overall logically consistent systems, and he could further have claimed that he himself, with his own use of contradictions as *upāya*, did not in any way admit that a contradiction could be true. However, sophisticated as such a position was, it was also problematic, if for example, a certain sūtra was *not* rated as *upāya*.⁹ Moreover, viewed from a general, non-Buddhist perspective, the use of “skillful means” could be judged a willful and unacceptable device.

In analyzing how Wōnhyo dealt with the issue of logicalness, one ought to further distinguish between logical inconsistency on the one hand and the epistemological problems of propositions such as that “in the Pure Land there is a jeweled forest” on the other which from the point of view of so-to-say pure term-logic is a consistent proposition, comparable to the logical consistency of a proposition like “Gretel's stepmother [in Brother Grimm's fairy tale] was an evil woman.” Also, Wōnhyo several times argues

that the *Sūtra of Immeasurable Life* is logically consistent, explicitly stating that a certain passage is not contradictory (相違) [WSW, 153, 157, 185]. Or he states: 所引經論隨門而說·故不相違, “The sūtras and treatises that are cited each approach the matter from their own perspective. Therefore, there is no contradiction” (WSW, 157). In his applications of the tetralemma (四句)¹⁰ that explain the “relationship of contamination and non-contamination,” he avoids contradictions by distinguishing between different aspects and different specifications of “contamination” and “non-contamination,” “defiled lands” and “pure lands,” and by using different quantifiers (WSW, 166–167, 170–72).

But it could also be possible that in treatises such as the *Essentials*, Wōnhyo at least in some places ignored the limitations of conceptual and verbalized knowledge he himself acknowledged and even emphasized in his notion of non-conceptual experience. Jörg Plassen, for instance, is of this opinion. Considering that Wōnhyo in his *Doctrinal Essentials of the Lotus Sūtra* asserts that ultimate reality is without duality and distinction (無二無別) (WSW, 84), I am inclined to agree with Plassen. Even more significant, Wōnhyo, in his *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*, distinguishes between meaningless, or ordinary, and meaningful words, implying—though perhaps unintentionally and unwillingly—that meaningful words, as spoken by the Buddha, do convey ultimate truth.¹¹ Or Wōnhyo may have followed what could be called a device of empty speech (which, seen from a general epistemological perspective, would again be highly problematic, to say the least). There even exist theological interpretations of Wōnhyo according to which his use of paradoxes and negations offers insights in the understanding of the Christian god.¹² However, in spite of all the problems involved in the devices of *upāya* such as “empty speech,” if the evidence provided above is of an exemplary or representative kind—as for instance the nine occurrences of the characters for contradiction 相違 in the *Doctrinal Essentials of the Lotus Sutra* indicate (WSW, 116, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138)—it would support my hypothesis that Wōnhyo was no adherent of a religious logic. Although Wōnhyo's belief in the contents of the sacred scriptures such as the assertion that there exists such things as a jeweled forest may be irrational, this does not necessarily imply that he accepts contradictions. In other words, we should distinguish between irrational belief in the truth of religious revelations or fairy tales on the one hand and rational insistence on the logical coherence of such texts on the other.

There are further passages in Wōnhyo that probably betray a kind of

irrational belief although they are not simply logically inconsistent. For example, in his *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*, Wōnhyo quotes the following propositions without expressing the slightest doubt about their truth.

If one hears the sūtra or retains even one four-line verse of it, that person will then access the stage of the Buddha's knowledge; one will be able to proselyte sentient beings with appropriate expedients and become the great spiritual mentor (*kalyāṇamitra*) of all living beings. (Buswell 2007, 58)

Given my assertion that Wōnhyo did not regard *contradictory* sacred teaching as valid, and leaving aside the problems of non-conceptual experience, I may however also be confronted with the question: What then, according to Wōnhyo, is so difficult or problematic with logic or logical proofs? Or should one perhaps ask more precisely: What, in his view, makes it so difficult to formulate a non-contradictory and conclusive Dignāgan inference? For philological purists may object translating characters like 道理 (Ch. *daoli*) in the final stanza of the *Critical Discussion* as “logic” or “logical.”¹³ First of all, and apparently, it is the shortness or brevity of formalized inferences, for almost all such inferences cannot sufficiently clear express the intended content. They simply leave room for different interpretations, among them mutually exclusive ones. This, for instance, is the case with the expressions “words convey [the Pure Land]” 言舉 and “image (component)” 相(分) (WPM, 286, and 286–288) and, even more problematic, “existence/being 有.” Second, since it is virtually impossible to take into account all aspects of the—indeed vast and complex—teachings explicitly or *implicitly* referred to or implied when formulating a formally correct inference, equally formally valid counter inferences are easily invented. Thus, as Wōnhyo illustrates, one short inference may be followed by another one and so on.¹⁴ Third, even the Dignāgan rules of a correct inference can perhaps be called into question. As I see it, Wōnhyo expresses his skepticism in formulating/analyzing what could be called meta-inferences, i.e. inferences that thematize Dignāgan rules. In this context, he points out that the “Emptiness School” held that, “*because of conditioned co-arising*” (*italics mine*), a Dignāgan inference would be valid even if it lacked one of the last two marks of a reason. As to this problem, I should like to offer the following tentative explanation. One can defend the position that the second and third marks are logically equivalent, i.e., “R is P” (the predicate/*sādhyā* P is a property of the reason/*hetu* R),”

and “Non-P is Non-R” are logically equivalent, and that this equivalence is ontologically founded in the fact of conditioned co-arising.¹⁵

However, because my arguments are somewhat speculative, for they are not based on respective statements by Wōnhyo himself, and because large passages in his works are phrased in a way that indeed makes it difficult to reconstruct them as logically consistent ones,¹⁶ one may again not share my assumption. But even then, Wōnhyo would still compare favorably to the Christian medieval logicians who propagated the doctrine of two truths. Also, his logical acumen would remain out of question. This acumen is also evident from Wōnhyo's antinomic inference aimed at rendering invalid Xuanzang's inference on consciousness only.¹⁷ One could further say in favor of Wōnhyo that he displayed much more tolerance with regard to those who did not share his belief than many Christian medieval logicians did, thus avoiding the dangers inherent in religious fundamentalism. But the basic problem of what may be called a religious and thus not universally valid logic would remain.

Paradoxical Logic, Mādhyamika Logic, and “Logic of Unlimited Affirmation”

Besides “Dignāgan logic,” Charles Muller attributes to Wōnhyo methods of discourse which he calls “paradoxical logic” and “Mādhyamika logic” (WSW, 16 and 19), and Jörg Plassen speaks of Wōnhyo's “logic of unlimited affirmation,” referring to phrases like “so and not so.” If Wōnhyo had been of the opinion that such logic includes unsolvable logical contradictions and if he had regarded such contradictions as expressions of truth, then the sheer number of respective instances would render his Buddhism utterly irrational. However, given his uncompromising rejection of contradictions in the *Critical Discussion*, and his repeated and explicit insistence on consistency as crucial for the acceptability of a certain passage in a sūtra, this is rarely conceivable. In the first place, many paradoxes and seemingly contradictory statements can be adequately reconstructed as consistent propositions. Secondly, if certain affirmative statements, in particular sequences of affirmative statements, do not permit for such reconstruction, they could be, and probably ought to be, understood as skillful means, namely rhetorical devices intended to show that ultimate truth cannot be expressed in words.

As already indicated above, such rhetoric would of course not imply that contradictions could be true. As to the first possibility, many paradoxical or seemingly inconsistent statements ought not to be taken literally, ambiguities could and should be dissolved, the different premises of seemingly contradictory conclusions ought to be made explicit, etc. The “double negation” in Mādhyamika logic can perhaps be understood as a couple of ontological assertions. In any case, one has to distinguish between contraries and contradictories (or dichotomies). For instance, since “not eternally existent” could mean “finally annihilated,” “dependently arisen/dependently existent,” or “empty,” its negation “not not eternally existent” does not necessarily mean “eternally existent” (for it could mean “not annihilated”). Phrases like “in this case, this being not so is not different from being so” (此之非然 不異於然) could mean that “not existing eternally” refers to “being empty” (Muller 2016, part 2.2.; see also Appendix 2).

Note further that Wōnhyo uses the qualification “in this case,” thus implying that “not so” can very well differ from “not not so.” And if we take the ontological assertion “An x exists,” this does not imply that “A non-x does not exist,” which, in turn, does not imply that “an x does not exist.” Moreover, to call, for example, the proposition that something is empty, itself empty, is *no logical negation*. I myself would not speak of a Mādhyamika *logic* unless I wanted to imply by this that such logic negates at least one universally valid logical principle. I need not emphasize thus disagreeing with Graham Priest’s interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s *Kārikā*, while basically agreeing with Marc Siderits and Shōryū Katsura’s interpretations in their translation. I myself have several times tried to show (e.g. Paul 2005) that one need not attribute to Nāgārjuna a kind of non-classical logic. Since Muller maintains that Wōnhyo tried to solve “ostensibly conflicting doctrinal problems through rigorous logic” (WSW, 19), he seems to hold that Wōnhyo, *in utilizing paradoxical and Mādhyamika logics*, did not permit for logical contradictions.

Dan Lusthaus’ Translation of the *Critical Discussion*, and My Analyses of Wōnhyo’s Logic

Dan Lusthaus’ impressive translation and explanations of the *Critical Discussion* make it difficult to add something significantly new. For instance,

he has already made it clear that Wŏnhyo knew what, in the so called West, is named the Liar's Paradox (WPM, 364, note 22), which, by the way, was also known by Mengzi 孟子 (4th and 3rd centuries BCE) and the Chinese Mohists (墨家, 4th century BCE) who are further examples of a transcultural awareness of a fundamental logical problem. In my analyses of Wŏnhyo's text, I limit myself to investigating a few passages that I find particularly interesting.

Inconsistencies in Buddhist Teachings, Methods to Solve Them and Related Questions

Wŏnhyo was aware that, from logical points of view, some sūtras include doctrines that are not easily reconciled with each other. Like other Buddhist scholastics he hence tried hard to develop interpretations and reconstructions that prove their mutual logical compatibility—which again shows that he regarded logical consistency as important. According to the “Introduction” to *Wŏnhyo's Philosophy of Mind*, he thereby does not so much try to rank the different Buddhist teachings,¹⁸ as most other scholastics did, but rather prefers to point out that different positions need not contradict each other since they are based on different premises. I again add that this may include characterizing a teaching as skillful means. Though, from a general perspective, Wŏnhyo's approach could also be used to rank Buddhist teachings, it testifies to a more content oriented and more tolerant approach. More important and interesting, in my view, are Wŏnhyo's attempts to show that expressions which seem to be contradictory ought to be understood in a specified sense thus turning out to be actually mere contraries. For instance, in his *Critical Discussion*, he asks whether the statement “Words do not reveal the Pure Land” is true. To answer this question, he distinguishes between conveyance of *knowledge* about the Pure Land and conveyance of *existence* of the Pure Land. Thus, he understands as contraries what reads like an application of the Tertium non datur and as contradictories/a dichotomy, namely the phrases, “If words do convey 若言舉者 [the Pure Land]” and “If [words] do not convey 若不舉者 [the Pure Land].” It is in this connection that he also points out that, to avoid the contradiction of the Liar's Paradox, the verbal statement “Words cannot convey knowledge about the Pure Land” is untenable.

Now, even some sūtras include inferences. Given Wŏnhyo's criticism at the

end of his *Critical Discussion*, one may ask how he evaluates such inferences. In particular, does he distinguish between such formalized inferences included in the *Critical Discussion* and the more informal ones included in sūtras? And if he does, could one conclude from this that he—as I have indicated above—regarded non-formal or less formal and more elaborate and detailed inferences a better means of argumentation and understanding than the brief formalized inferences?

Another question is what Wŏnhyo precisely means when he says “I laugh [at the attempts to prove a teaching by a formalized Dignāgan inference]?” Did he really believe that “the sacred teachings” could be “easily” understood? He must have known and been aware that at least some of the “sacred teachings” are *not* “easy to understand.” His own works testify to this. In this connection, one may even ask whether Wŏnhyo did distinguish between faith and understanding. Many Catholics believe in the Holy Trinity without ever being able to understand¹⁹ this “mystery.”

The Relationship Between Sacred Teachings and Logicalness According to the *Treatise on the Ten Ways of Resolving Controversies*, the *Doctrinal Essentials of the Sūtra of Immeasurable Life* and the *Critical Discussion*

Charles Muller refers to Wŏnhyo’s commentarial works [on Buddhist sūtras] by pointing out Wŏnhyo’s guiding interest in the “resolution of doctrinal disputes,” stating, “The implications of this concept in Wŏnhyo are seen in many ways, going from his strict logic-grounded methodology to his profound, faith oriented form of discourse” (WPM, 165). However, this statement leaves open the crucial question of whether or not such faith-oriented discourse includes acceptance of illogical teachings. In what follows, I shall deal with this question by thematizing examples of Wŏnhyo’s view and usage of the *catuṣkoṭi* (tetralemma) and his discussions of Buddha nature and various inferences about the properties of sound. One should be aware that what is decisive is whether Wŏnhyo regards logical consistency a necessary condition of truth and if he therefore tries to show that even ostensibly inconsistent sacred texts are logically consistent. It is of only minor relevance whether he always succeeds in his attempts.

Wŏnhyo's Concept of *Catuṣkoṭi*

In his *Treatise on the Ten Ways of Resolving Controversies*, Wŏnhyo leaves no doubt that he regards a correct instance of a *catuṣkoṭi* as logically consistent. (This, by the way, was also Kūkai's [空海, 774–835] opinion, and it was also a widespread philosophical position in ancient Europe [Sturm 1996].) Using a *catuṣkoṭi* to explain what he regards as valid notions of emptiness and existence, Wŏnhyo concludes, “Thus all four logical possibilities [*catuṣkoṭi*] are posited side by side, and we are free from error” (WPM, 168).²⁰ Though the translation “four logical possibilities” for 四句 (Ch. *siju*, Kor. *sagu*, Jpn. *shiku*) may be problematic,²¹ because the characters just mean something like “four phrases” or “tetralemma,” Wŏnhyo would never have made such a statement, if he had accepted contradictory truths. This is also clear from another sentence included in this explanation, namely that “both [i.e. the first and second lemma] can be posited without contradicting each other” (不相違). Moreover, there are further passages in the *Treatise on the Ten Ways of Resolving Controversies* (WPM, 168, 172, 173, 174) which explicitly and undeniably testify to Wŏnhyo's insistence on non-contradiction as a necessary condition of truth. As shown above, even in his *Doctrinal Essentials of the Sūtra of Immeasurable Life* (hereafter *Essentials*), he formulates his tetralemmas as logically consistent ways of argument. Such passages confirm Wŏnhyo's uncompromising rejection of contradictions in his *Critical Discussion*. They also, however, show that Wŏnhyo does not stick to the ideal structure of the *catuṣkoṭi*, and that he uses key terms in different meanings and different respects to construct a consistent argument (see Appendix 2). Also, in other places, he uses such terms in a kind of metaphorical sense (cf. WPM, 176), and warns against taking every expression literally.²² In my opinion, some such methods are not particular to him, but can even be found in Nāgārjuna's *Kārikā*, not to mention other examples.

Wŏnhyo's Discussion of Buddha Nature

Wŏnhyo's discussion of Buddha nature in his *Treatise on the Ten Ways of Resolving Controversies* (hereafter *Ten Ways*) includes a passage, in which he uses the criterion of logical consistency to determine the meaning of what the scriptures say about the attainment of awakening:

Supposing that all who have minds are bound to attain [awakening], are those who have already attained awakening [as for instance buddhas who, as buddhas, “have a mind”²³] also bound to attain it? Thus we know [the scriptures] are not saying that all who have minds are bound to attain [awakening]. (WPM, 172; see also Muller 2016, part 2.4.1.)

Wōnhyo’s discussion of Buddha nature in the *Ten Ways* also deals with the question of whether all seeds produce effects. Wōnhyo starts by applying the Tertium non datur (all ... not all). Then he dismisses one of the two alternatives (i.e., not all) by pointing out that it implies the self-contradiction that seeds are no seeds. Turning to the second alternative, he again applies the Tertium non datur, distinguishing two possible cases (... are ... are no/not). He then concludes that both do not imply or lead to contradictions.²⁴

Hence, in discussing the question of how scriptural passages about the Buddha nature ought to be understood, Wōnhyo *explicitly* brings into play the criterion of non-contradiction. In his *Ten Ways* (WPM, 172–174), he seven times rejects certain interpretations, or views, because of their contradictions (相違). These are clear examples that Wōnhyo regarded logical consistency a criterion of scriptural truth. Coming back to my above speculations, his logical analysis of the effects of seeds may indeed testify to the standpoint that a continuous strain of arguments is more promising than the usage of Dignāgan inference forms.

In his treatment of the issue of Buddha nature in the *Critical Discussion*, Wōnhyo uses the same argument as in the *Ten Ways* (WPM, 172), which, by the way, is one example that testifies to the close methodological relationship between the two treatises.

Though rather limited, my discussion thus far indicates that Wōnhyo did indeed not advance, or follow, a religious logic. (In this respect, his approach in interpreting Buddhist scriptures is similar to that of Averroës’ [1126–1198] interpretation of the *Quran*. Though such a comparison seems far-fetched to philologists and historians, it may serve to support my views about universal logic.)

Wōnhyo’s Analyses of Various Inferences About the Properties of Sound

Finally, I turn to Wōnhyo’s analyses of various inferences about the properties of sound. Concurring with the Vaiśeṣikas and other Buddhists, he rejects the

inference “Sound is permanent. Because of audibility.” He does this for several reasons. Like Dignāgan logicians, he regards the reason as “too restricted” or “utterly unique” and thus inconclusive. In adducing what can be called meta-inferences, Wōnhyo further argues that even (some or all?) formally valid inferences about which of the three marks an inference must fulfill to be valid, cannot justify application of the reason “audibility” (not to mention inferences that are only seemingly valid), thus displaying his understanding of Dignāgan logic. Wōnhyo ends up by coming to what I personally regard as the only clear explanation of the rather cumbersome (or at least intricate) notion of “utter uniqueness.” Probably because this notion is dictated by the Dignāgan terminological system, it does not contribute very much to a clear understanding of the problem of the inference, “Sound is eternal. Because of audibility.” Dignāga was forced to include in his *Wheel of Reason* (*Hetucakra*) the fifth case, namely, absence of the reason in both the domains of similar and exclusionary examples. Otherwise he would not have covered all combinatory possible relationships between the reason on the one hand and (instances of) the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* on the other. Such complete covering was necessary to identify (or find out) the criteria a reason R must fulfill to render valid the inference “S is P” (The predicate/*sādhyā* P is a property of the subject/*pakṣa* S.), because ‘S is R’ (The reason/*hetu* R is a property of the subject/*pakṣa* S.)” To repeat, it was the basic question of Dignāgan inference theory that led Dignāga to include case 5 in his *Wheel of Reasons*. However, there is only one possibility for fulfilling this case, namely when the subject (*pakṣa* S) functions as reason (*hetu* R). Now, “utterly unique” implies just this. Thus, the reason “audibility” can be replaced by the subject (S) “sound.” In my opinion, it is this conclusion which leads Wōnhyo to confront the inference “Sound is eternal. Because of audibility” with the inference “[Sound] is impermanent. Because of audibility,” explaining “In this way [reason ...] can be used to justify anything.” Indeed, since the reason “audibility” can be replaced by “sound,” one can put forward inferences like “S is P, because S is S.” Since “S is S” is always valid, such an inference could prove everything. Wōnhyo rightly concludes that because “these are contradictory, their reasons are inconclusive.” One could, however, go further. If “S is R,” “R is P,” “S is P,” and “S is Non-P” were valid, R would also be Non-P, which in turn would imply “R is Non-R.” My use of term symbols is motivated by the fact that, like Aristotelian and Mohist logic, the theory of logic in the “science of reasons,” Wōnhyo’s logic included, is a term-logic.²⁵

Lastly, I have difficulties with the idea of tripartitionism. From a (meta-)logical point of view the whole issue can be easily solved by simply pointing out that, as long as the subject S is a “subject in dispute,” it must not function as reason, because then the Law of transitivity leads to self-contradictions. Independent of this, S of course does belong *either* to the domain of Ps *or* Non-Ps. To put it another way, seen from a general (meta-)logical perspective there is actually no question of (a logical) tripartitionism. One can simply not prove anything by saying that an A is an A.

Conclusion

To sum up; though I am aware of the limits and limitations of my discussions, I dare say that in spite of being a devout Buddhist, Wōnhyo was probably no proponent of a religious logic. At least, his *Critical Discussion* and his *Ten Ways* strongly support this hypothesis. In my opinion, even such treatises as the *Essentials* do not imply that Wōnhyo did not acknowledge (or did deny the validity of) a principle like the Law of non-contradiction. Nevertheless, commentaries like the *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra* still need further logical analysis.

An outstanding logician, Wōnhyo is an exquisite counter-example to the prejudice that Eastern thought or Buddhism in general are deficient in logical reasoning. Certainly, he compares favorably with many medieval Christian logicians.

Muller, Plassen and others call Wōnhyo a religious person, and he himself emphasizes the importance of belief. However, he certainly did not believe in a being comparable to the Christian god, Allah or Īśvāra.²⁶ What then could it mean that he believed, say, in the Buddha of the *Lotus Sūtra*, in the existence of bodhisattvas, in the Pure Land, and in *nirvāṇa* and salvation? If it was belief in a kind of physical existence of a supernatural Buddha or the Pure Land, it should perhaps still be classified as a religious one, but if it was belief only in certain stages of consciousness (as Wōnhyo’s identification of the *realms* of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* indicates) or belief only in a kind of non-discriminative knowledge (i.e. direct perception or pure experience that would enable people to free themselves from suffering), then I would be reluctant to call this religious belief, although it would certainly be a kind of soteriological belief. Like other instances of

such soteriological belief, however, it would be logically problematic. First, the impossibility of knowing ultimate reality by discriminative knowledge does not at all imply that there is actually something like non-discriminative knowledge. If Wōnhyo's extensive use of paradoxes and, if taken literally, contradictions, especially his device of what Plassen calls unlimited affirmation, can indeed be adequately understood and explained as *upāya*, then it would *presuppose* faith, but would *not justify* it. It could be convincing only for Buddhist believers. To put it clearly, although Wōnhyo certainly rejected and tried to avoid logical mistakes, all his arguments were based on a firm and unquestioned belief in Buddhist truth and salvation—in this respect similar to the positions of Averroës and Leibniz (1646–1716) who, in spite of being outstanding logicians, never called into question the existence of Allah or the Christian god. And second, if one cannot *express by words any knowledge* about ultimate reality one cannot assert that ultimate reality is non-dual, i.e. lacks any internal distinctions. A comparison with Kant may be helpful. Kant argued that we cannot know “things as they are,” meaning by knowledge a kind of experience that implies application of concepts, and insisting that no other knowledge exists. In other words, whereas Kant held that discriminative knowledge is the only knowledge possible and therefore to be honored, Buddhists like Wōnhyo maintained that such knowledge is of an only provisional kind and therefore inferior to an also possible non-discriminative ultimate knowledge.

Appendix 1

Almost all Buddhist scholastics who tried to show that the different Mahāyāna teachings are compatible with each other—Wōnhyo included—did so by maintaining that all teachings were determined by different premises, the decisive difference being the specific capabilities of the addressees to understand and follow the teachings in a way that would enable them to eventually reach salvation. (Cf. Wōnhyo's *Doctrinal Essentials of the Lotus Sūtra*; WSW, 92–93.) By interpreting or employing contradictions as skillful or expedient means (Skt. *upāya*, Ch. *fangbian*, Kor. *paṅg'p'yōn*, Jpn. *hōben* 方便),²⁷ one could easily attribute to a text that included contradictory passages an overall consistency, or, if oneself liked to indulge in sequences of contradictions, maintain that they must not be understood as propositional but (to use a modern term) performative expressions, intended to motivate or encourage/ask people to look and strive for salvation. In other words, in all such cases, a contradiction could be viewed as an instrument that those who, so to say, really knew, *did not regard as a true proposition*.

In the history of Mahāyāna scholasticism the device of *upāya* degenerated into a convenient tool to prove or disprove almost anything and became a willful and almost worthless instrument. Thus, usage of *upāya* is not very persuasive.

Appendix 2

In the following, I offer a logically consistent reconstruction of a tetralemma (*catuskoṭi*) that Wōnhyō used in his *Treatise on the Ten Ways of Resolving Controversies*. Though my attempt may be partly tentative, this does not change the fact that Wōnhyō, in the chosen example, explicitly tried to formulate a logically consistent tetralemma, namely four propositions that amount to maintaining that everything that exists (1) does *not* exist eternally, but is empty, (2) is *not* annihilated, but is empty, (3) does *not* exist eternally *and* is *not* annihilated, but is empty, (4) is *not* annihilated *and* does *not* exist eternally (?), but (a) is empty / (b) is “emptily empty” (?). The round brackets and the accentuation by bold lettering in the following citations are mine. Nguyen’s translation of the tetralemma (*catuskoṭi*) in question (WPM, 167–168) reads:

(1) **Being**, as it is designated here, is **not different from emptiness**. Thus, although it is designated as being, it is not artificial reification [samāropa] (not eternally existent). It is provisionally designated [prajñapta] as being, but in reality it does not fall into [a reified concept of] something existing. (2) **Being**, as it is designated here, cannot but fall into the category of existence. Thus, although it is **not different from emptiness**, it is not destructive negation [apavāda] (not annihilated).²⁸

(1a?) What previously was described as **really existent** is **not different from** the existence of **emptiness**. (2a?) What subsequently was described as not falling into [a reified concept of] something existing is **being** that does **not** fall into being **different from emptiness**. (3) Therefore **both** (existence that is not eternal and existence that cannot be, or is not, annihilated) can be posited without contradicting each other (不相違). Because neither is not so, **both** are posited. (4) Yet because they are not so, **neither** (annihilated “being” nor eternal being) is posited. This being not so is not different from being so (此之非然不異於然)—just as **being existent** is **not different from being empty**. Therefore, though neither is posited, we do not lose the basic teachings of our school. Thus all four logical possibilities [*catuskoṭi*] are posited side by side, and we are free from error.

Muller (2016, part 2.2.) translates:

The (1) **existence** that is here acknowledged is **not different from emptiness**. Therefore, even though it is like the prior, it is not reified (no eternal existence). Provisionally acknowledged existence actually does not fall into [the extreme of] emptiness. (2) The **existence** that is here accepted cannot but fall into existence. Therefore, even though it is like the latter, it has not been negated (i.e. annihilated).

(1a?) The previously described **true existence** is existence that is **not different from emptiness**. (2a?) The subsequently explained “**not** falling into [a reified concept of] existence” is the **existence** that does **not** fall into [the error of] being **different from emptiness**. Therefore (3) **both** are accepted without contradiction (不相違). Since it is not that they are not-so, **both** can be accepted and (4) yet be not-so, and hence **both are denied**. “Not-so” in this case is not different from being so (此之非然 不異於然), just as this **existence** is **not different from emptiness**. Therefore, even though both are denied, we do not controvert the original [Buddhist] teaching. In this way the four logical possibilities can be advocated together without any error.

According to Muller (2016, note 15), the “four possibilities” are “the existing; the empty; both; neither.” In my opinion, and as indicated above, it would be more adequate to explain Wŏnhyo’s tetralemma as follows: (1) existent, but not eternally existent, i.e. **empty** (2) existent without being annihilated, i.e. **empty**, (3) not eternally existent and not annihilated, i.e. **empty**, (4a) not not eternally existent, i.e. not annihilated, and not not annihilated, i.e. not eternally existent (?), i.e. **empty** / (4b) emptily existent in the sense of **empty emptiness** (?). Such an interpretation would be similar to Nguyen’s (see WPM 331–332, notes 9–11), but can also be justified by Muller’s translation in spite of its differences from Nguyen’s translation. Independent of this, the interpretation of the fourth lemma poses a problem, for, according to Wŏnhyo, it must not be a logically contradictory negation of the third lemma. Interpretation (4a) may be more plausible than (4b), though “being empty in an empty way” is also a logically consistent one and moreover a Mādhyamika device of “negation,” Wŏnhyo was familiar with and thought acceptable in certain respects (for example see Buswell 2007, 173–174). As indicated above, one should be aware that statements like “S is empty” are also empty and so on, and are no negations of “S is empty” and so

on, but rather (meta-)affirmations, comparable to saying “‘S is P’ is a statement’ is again a statement” etc.

Kim (2011, 172–173) speaks of “four presuppositions” (“vier Voraussetzungen”), namely “[1] being, [2] non-being, [3] *neither* being *nor* non-being, [4] *both* being *and* non-being,” which does not explain anything, since what is relevant, and thus should be made explicit, is the different meanings of “being.” Even more problematic, schematic and general characterizations like Kim’s fail to characterize most actual applications of the tetralemma and wrongly suggest that tetrallemmas are logically inconsistent. “Vier Voraussetzungen” is of course no acceptable translation of “tetralemma.”

In any case, Wōnhyo tried hard to show that the quoted tetralemma is logically consistent, *explicitly maintaining that all four lemmas express the proposition that everything is empty*. Going even further, he says that they (therefore) are in keeping with the original Buddhist teachings, and concludes that the tetralemma is thus free of “any error.” Already in his introduction to the tetralemma, Wōnhyo makes it clear that “hating existence and loving emptiness” (憎有愛空) amounts to believing in eternal existence and annihilation, comparable to “ignoring the trees while thinking to enter a forest,” i.e. thus contradicting oneself (trans. Muller 2016, 2.1; see also Nguyen, WPM 331, note 8).

Ye Shaoyong (2019, especially p. 76) maintains that Nāgārjuna, in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, denies every kind of what may be called “existence.” But this would mean that there are not only no substantial entities, but also *no empty “things,” namely no unsubstantial “things,” devoid of inherent nature, lacking independence*. In my opinion, this would then apply from both a conventional perspective and from the perspective of ultimate truth. According to Ye, Kumārajīva’s *Zhonglun* 中論 does not take over such unqualified (“absolute”) denial, thus deviating from the *Kārikā*. If I understand Siderits/Katsura (2013, 185) correctly, they side with Kumārajīva’s understanding (though they do not refer to the *Zhonglun*) since they comment on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (17.21 ff.) by explaining “that an action is said not to perish because *ultimately* no actions arise” (italics mine).

However, I am not sure whether Ye’s argumentation is consistent, or whether I somehow misunderstand him, since on page 79 he says that, in the *Kārikā*, “the middle position is established solely in the ultimate truth,” (i.e. that it *is established*, and that this, moreover, is done *in a non-conceptual way*) which

seems to contradict his statements on page 76. In support of his position he points out that the *Kārikā* rejects the notion of continuity, or continuous causal processes, whereas the *Zhonglun* does not. Perhaps one should distinguish between a series constituted by a sequence of separate, independent moments or elements (that the *Kārikā* must reject), and a so-to-say uninterrupted sequence, though this also poses problems.

Wōnhyo's argumentation was of course based on the *Zhonglun*. In my opinion, if Ye Shaodong should be correct, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* would be basically inconsistent. Unfortunately, I cannot pursue the issue further in this place.

Notes

- 1 Frankenhauer (1966, 11) calls Xuanzang's *yinming* logic a religious one.
- 2 In Catholicism, the disregard of and even contempt for “worldly” wisdom and knowledge and the praise of faith goes back to Saint Paul who told the Corinthians (1 Cor. 3:19) that “the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.” And already the early Christian theologian Tertullian (c. 2nd and 3rd cen.) wrote: “We want no ... inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further belief.” (Tertullian, *On the Prescription of Heretics*, VII. Re-quoted from Nixey [2017, 149]). In Catholic history, there are many similar statements.
- 3 *Critical Discussion on Inference* (WPM, 297). Muller (2008) translates:
The accomplishment of logic is exceedingly difficult to conceive,
I laugh at my mistake—taking the subtle to be easily understandable.
Now, relying on the sacred teaching, I raise one corner [of the whole],
May the buddha-dharma circulate in this life and hereafter.
- 4 *Muryangsugyeong jong-yo* 無量壽經宗要 (HPC 1.562a6–10) and also, *Doctrinal Essentials of the Sūtra of Immeasurable Life* (WPM, 41; WSW, 207).
- 5 Italics mine. Perhaps a more adequate translation of 不可比量 would be “... cannot be apprehended by means of [Dignāgan] inferences.” However, Wōnhyo himself, in his *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*, constructs Dignāgan inferences in order to enforce (the efficiency of) certain arguments. See Buswell (2007, 281).
- 6 At least, as I understand Wōnhyo. For instance see Buswell (2007, 243–245). According to Kim (2011, 170), however, Wōnhyo held that “absolute truth ... comprises ... self-contradictory logic.”
- 7 In WSW (145) we find, “Since the one scroll does not suffice to awaken people, and since three would be too many to hold in two hands, this sūtra [of Immeasurable Life] has exactly one prior and one latter section” (145).
- 8 See for example Buswell (2007, 245–246). Wōnhyo's distinction between “the shallowness and depth of one's faculties” [i.e. the faculties of the persons, addressed by the Buddha] was a convenient, and among Buddhist scholastics widely accepted, means for explaining the differences that existed between the teachings of the sūtras. However, such a distinction can be easily used to discriminate against one's opponents. Seen from a non-Buddhist perspective, it is a questionable device.
- 9 In his *Preface to the Commentary on the Jin Translation of the Flower Ornament Sūtra* (*Chinyōk Hwaōm kyōngso sō* 晉譯花嚴經疏序), Wōnhyo states: “this sūtra is the perfectly complete dharma-wheel of the unsurpassed sudden teaching” 是經者·斯乃圓滿無上頓教法輪 (WSW, 59–60). If this statement is an expedient then it does not imply that Wōnhyo himself did or wanted to advance the *proposition* that the sūtra is the ultimate teaching. It would then be a tool for helping the addressees to gain salvation by making them believe that the sūtra is ultimate teaching. However, the

statement would then also make the addressees believe that the sūtra is a text which in a comprehensive and detailed way expresses what actually cannot at all be verbalized (namely ultimate truth). If the statement that the sūtra is ultimate teaching is no expedient, it bluntly contradicts the position that ultimate truth cannot be expressed verbally. See also Appendix 1.

10 Muller translates tetralemma as “four perspectives.”

11 See Buswell (2007, 221–223). Applying the Law of contraposition, Wōnhyo states: “今佛說法若是文言即無實義。若有實義應非文言” (T 1730, 34.992a28–29). Buswell (2007, 221) translates this as: “Now, if the Buddha’s preaching of the dharma were all verbalization and locution, it then in fact would have no real meaning, and if it had real meaning, it necessarily would be free of verbalization and locution.” A more precise translation that exhibits the logical structure of the phrase would be: “Now, if the Buddha’s teaching of the dharma were verbalization and locution, it then in fact [?] would have no real meaning, and if it had real meaning, it necessarily [?] would be no verbalization and locution.” Moreover, by agreeing with the Buddha’s statement in the *Sūtra*: 我所說者義語非文 (T 1730, 34.992b3), “My speech consists of meaningful words, not locution” (Buswell 2007, 221), Wōnhyo himself affirms that there exists meaningful speech and that the Buddha *speaks* (Buswell 2007, 222). In my opinion, Wōnhyo thus contradicts his claim that words cannot convey ultimate meaning, falling victim to the temptation to express his faith.

Another application of the Law of contraposition can be found in one of Wōnhyo’s quotations of the *Vajrasamādhi Sūtra* (Buswell 2007, 243).

12 In Ko Young Woon’s book (2010), the first sentence (p. 1) of the book reads: “This book examines the significance of balance between the opposites in order to understand God and the world.”

13 Buswell (2007, 76), also translates *daoli* (T 1730, 34.966c) as “logic.”

14 See WPM, 291–293. However, as already mentioned, in his *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*, Wōnhyo himself puts forward two inferences to enforce (the efficiency of) an argument (Buswell 2007, 281).

15 It is interesting to compare this with Dan Lusthaus’ comments in WPM (373, note 74).

16 This applies in particular to Wōnhyo’s *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*. See Buswell’s translation. To show that Wōnhyo, in his commentary, conceived of this *Sūtra* as a logically consistent text, would certainly be a formidable task, to say the least. See also the quote from *Doctrinal Essentials of the Sutra of Immeasurable Life* (HPC 1.562a24–b8) in the “General Introduction” to WPM (41–42). See also note 6 above.

17 This antinomic inference was also part of the complete *P’an piryang non*. See Tang Minjun’s contribution to this volume, and Tang (2018, 184–186). See also Moro Shigeki’s contribution. The fact that “Wōnhyo wrote many works of Buddhist logic ...” (as Moro states) not only testifies to Wōnhyo’s great interest in logic, but may also be seen as indicating respective competence.

- 18 However, according to Kim (2011, 177–182), Wōnhyo too formulated a kind of ranking system, distinguishing between (1) the particular/discriminative teaching of the Three Vehicles 三乘別教 (Four Noble Truths, *Pratitya-Samutpāda*), (2) the permeating teaching of the Three Vehicles 三乘通教 (*Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra*), (3) the segmented [geteilte] teaching of the One Vehicle 一乘分教 (*Brahmajāla-Sūtra*, *Sūtra of the Precious Necklace of the Bodhisattva*), and (4) the perfect teaching of the One Vehicle 一乘滿教 (*Avataṃsaka Sūtra*).
- 19 This is in the sense of being able to explain or to comprehend what is offered as an explanation.
- 20 Translation is by Cuong T. Nguyen. Other translations are by Myong-Hee Kim (2011, 132–190), and by Charles Muller (2016). Kim's comments are not very helpful, for he simply does not deal with the apparent logical problems.
- 21 See WSW (111, 112) and the—as I believe, however misleading—entry for 四句 in DDB.
- 22 Wōnhyo himself does not take inconsistent expressions literally, if this would preclude showing that they ultimately mean the same or are compatible with each other. See for example, 言有左右意致還同 and 心空空心語有左右。只是一心本覺之義。(T 1730, 34.966b3–4) translated as, “Though there may be some inconsistencies in the terminology employed, the intent [of the three scriptural passages (*Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*, *Awakening of Faith*, *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*)] is essentially the same.” And, “There may be some inconsistencies in the terms ‘the mind is void’ and ‘voidness of mind,’ but both of these just refer to the aspect of the original enlightenment of the mind.” (Buswell 2007, 75, 77)
- 23 This is from *Critical Discussion* (WPM, 294).
- 24 For a better understanding the extended translation is re-quoted from Muller (2016, part 2.4.2).

我今問汝 隨汝意答。如是種子當言一切 皆當生果。當言亦有不生果者。若言亦有不生果者、不生果故則非種子。若言一切皆當生果者、是則種子雖多必有、終盡、以無不生果者故。若言雖一切種子皆當生果、而種子無窮故、無終盡而無自語相違過者。

I will now ask you [a] question. Please answer as you see fit. Are such seeds to be explained as producing effects in the future without exception? Or should we say that there are some that do not produce effects? If you say that there are some that do not produce effects, then if they do not produce effects, they are not seeds. If we say that all will produce effects, then even though these seeds are certainly numerous, they will eventually be exhausted, since there are none that do not produce effects. If you say that even though all seeds will produce effects, yet since seeds are infinite in number, then there is no exhaustion, and also no contradiction of one's own statement.

Note that Wōnhyo presupposes that only seeds that “produce effects” are seeds or should be called seeds. This differs from the use, or meaning, of “seeds” as for instance in German. In German, seeds that fail to germinate into plants are nevertheless regarded as,

and called, seeds.

25 See my respective chapter in the Lumbini volume (2015).

26 For example, in his *Exposition of the Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*, Wōnhyo rejects belief in a creator (作者) (T 1730, 34.966b2; Buswell 2007, 78).

27 In the *Essentials*, the characters 方便 are used more often than sixty times. According to WSW (109), Wōnhyo probably rated the *Lotus Sūtra* as an expedient, as merely a provisional text.

28 As Nguyen explains (WPM, 332, n. 9), the Yogācāra categories *samāropa* and *apavāda* refer to the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism.

Abbreviations

- DDB *Digital Dictionary of Buddhism*. www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb/. 2019.
- HPC *Han'guk Pulgyo chŏnsŏ* 韓國佛教全書 [The Collected Works of Korean Buddhism]. Seoul: Dongguk University Press, 1979.
- WPM Muller, Charles A., and Cuong T. Nguyen, eds. *Wŏnhyo's Philosophy of Mind*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012.
- WSW Wŏnhyo. *Selected Works*, ed. Charles A. Muller [Chinese and English], trans. Charles A. Muller, Jin Y. Park, and Sem Vermeersch. *Collected Works of Korean Buddhism*, Vol. 1. Paju: Chun-il Munhwasa, 2012.
- T *Taishō shinsū daizōkyō* 大正新脩大藏經. [Revised Buddhist canon compiled during the Taishō reign period], eds. Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe Kaikyoku 渡邊海旭 et. al., 100 vols., Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai 大正一切經刊行會, 1924–1935.

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