

## Metalogic in East Asia: Discussion on the Antinomic Reason (\*viruddhāvyaḥicārin) in P’an piryang non

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# Metalogic in East Asia: Discussion on the Antinomic Reason (\**viruddhāvyabbhicārin*) in *P'an p'iryang non*\*

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## Abstract

*Although the tradition of the East Asian Buddhist logic is a transmission of the system of Indian logic established by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), it developed in its own way in East Asia. East Asian Buddhist logic should be reconsidered in the context of the East Asian Buddhist tradition, instead of based on Western or Indian logic-centrism.*

*The twelfth section of P'an piryang non written by Wōnhyo (617–686) metalogically discusses the logical problem of the antinomic reason (\*viruddhāvyabhicārin), one of the fallacies of the reason of the three-part syllogism. Some textual problems remain in the section preserved in the manuscript of Otani University. Wōnhyo seemed to have a keen interest in the antinomic reason. Although Dignāga categorizes the antinomic reason as one of the six fallacies of the inconclusive reasons, it has been questioned whether the categorization is valid by premodern Buddhist logicians and current scholars. Wōnhyo tried to solve the problem through a kind of reductio ad absurdum method. Thus, he transformed the principle of the antinomic reason and showed the tautological redefinition, which probably is in conflict with the rule of the fallacy of both-agreement. According to these points, Wōnhyo's perspective of the antinomic reason seems to resemble the standpoint of Mun'gwae (fl. 7th century) more rather than that of Kuiji (632–682).*

*These points found in the short descriptions of P'an piryang non probably express the features of Wōnhyo's logic and not of his logical misinterpretation. We need an even more detailed examinations of P'an piryang non from the viewpoints of textual criticism and logic.*

**Key words:** Wōnhyo, P'an piryang non, hetuvidyā, antinomic reason, viruddhāvyabhicārin

## Introduction

Although the tradition of East Asian Buddhist logic (Ch. *yinming*, Kor. *inmyōng*, Jp. *inmyō*) is a transmission of the system of logic established by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), one of the most important scholar monks in the tradition of the Indian logic, it developed in its own way in East Asia. Although Dignāgan logic also includes epistemology and the theory of meaning, such as the *apoha* theory, one of the central concerns of East Asian Buddhist logicians is the theory of thirty-three fallacies introduced in Xuanzang's (602–664) translation of the *Niyāyapraśaṅga* (NP), written by Śaṅkarasvāmin (ca. 500–560). This central concern was largely because the development of the theory in East Asia had been based mainly on the exegesis of the NP.<sup>1</sup> Kuiji's (632–682) commentary on the NP (*Yinming ruzhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏 or *Yinming dashu* 因明大疏; YDS) and Mun'gwe's 文軌<sup>2</sup> (fl. 7th century) *Inmyōng ipchōngi ron so* 因明入正理論疏 (IS) had played a significant role in the development of East Asian Buddhist logic. In Japan, many texts of Buddhist logic on the thirty-three fallacies, especially on four kinds of contradictory reasons, had been written from the Heian period (794–1185) to the Meiji period (1868–1912) (Takemura 1986; Moro 2018b).

Based on his in-depth knowledge of the Indian logic and Western symbolic logic, Nakamura Hajime (1912–1999) severely criticizes Kuiji's interpretation of the Dignāgan logic. Nakamura claims, "When the Indian logic was imported into China, it seems that Kuiji could not fully understand the characteristics of the inference defined in the *hetuvidyā* (Indian logic) system" (1960, 5). In addition, Nakamura repeatedly criticizes Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only (Ch. *weishi biliang* 唯識比量)<sup>3</sup> and Kuiji's interpretation (Nakamura 1960; 1989). In contrast, Nakamura evaluates highly the criticism of Xuanzang's proof by Wōnhyo 元曉 (617–686) and Sun'gyōng 順憬 (fl. 7th century) and states as follows:

Generally speaking, Korean Buddhist logicians were seriously engaged in the difficult problems of perception and inference. People probably do not believe it, but it is true that the issues of antinomy, which were also discussed in earnest in Kantian philosophy, had been already discussed by Korean Buddhist logicians as a problem of the antinomic reason (\**viruddhāvvyabbicārin*). (Nakamura 1989, 285)

In opposition to Nakamura's evaluation, Moro (2015a) criticizes his Western and Indian logic-centrism and claims that the East Asian Buddhist logic should be reconsidered in the context of the East Asian Buddhist tradition.<sup>4</sup> In addition, comparing the interpretation of Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only by Kuiji with that of other scholar monks, such as Wŏnhyo, Moro (2015a) demonstrates that there were at least two lineages in Silla Buddhism with regard to the proof; the lineage of Wŏnhyo and Sun'gyŏn, who regarded the proof as invalid, and the group consisting of Tojŭng 道證, Kyŏnghŭng 憬興, Taehyŏn 大賢 and Mun'gwe<sup>5</sup> who did not necessarily consider it invalid. The complete picture of East Asian Buddhist logic will be gradually revealed by investigating each text of logic in terms of the differences or logical diversity among the scholar monks. In this paper, I analyze the metalogical discussion on antinomic reason (\**viruddhāvvyabhicārin*) in Wŏnhyo's *P'an p'iryang non* 判比量論 (*Critical Discussions on Inferences*) to understand East Asian Buddhist logic better.

### *P'an p'iryang non* and the Antinomic Reason

As revealed by ancient catalogs of Buddhist scriptures, Wŏnhyo wrote several works of Buddhist logic, including a commentary on the NP (Takemura 1986, 40–41).<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, all of his works on Buddhist logic, except the *P'an p'iryang non*, do not currently exist. The *P'an p'iryang non* remains only in the fragments from the same manuscript.<sup>7</sup> Until recently, only the fragments owned by Kanda Kiichirō (Fukihara 1967)<sup>8</sup> and Sakai Ukichi 酒井宇吉 (Fukihara 1969) were known. However, recent research, such as that by Dōtsu (2017), Kim (2017), and Okamoto (2018), have introduced newly found fragments,<sup>9</sup> and, as a result, the restoration studies are underway. Before the recent researches, Miyazaki (1995), however, claimed that the remaining manuscripts would make-up one-fifth of the original.

According to the surviving fragments, the *P'an p'iryang non* originally consisted of at least fourteen sections. Each section is sequentially numbered and seems to discuss a separate problem without having any mutual relations with other sections.

Moro (2018b) classifies the discussions in the field of East Asian Buddhist logic, or *yinming*, into two types: (1) the discussions on *yinming* itself, namely,

the theoretical issues of *yinming*, such as the validity of the reasoning or fallacies, argued based on the critical examination of commentaries; and (2) the discussions on logical problems in proving certain religious or philosophical arguments, such as the proof of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna scriptures.<sup>10</sup> Because the scriptures of Buddhist logic, including the NP, often substitute examples for logical descriptions—for instance “[the fallacy of] the contradiction in one’s own prior statements [*\*svārtha-viruddha*] is an argument like ‘my mother is a barren woman’”<sup>11</sup>—discussions of the first type also examine such examples; but the authors do not intend to demonstrate their beliefs or thoughts through examples.

Although the sixth, eleventh, and twelfth sections of the *P'an p'iryang non* discuss the first-type topics, the remaining sections deal with the second-type problems. The subjects of the numbered sections of *P'an p'iryang non* are as follows:

- Section 6: Discussion on Dignāga’s theory of direct perception (*\*pratyakṣa*) and inference or reasoning (*anumāna*) (a fragmental section).
- Section 7: Discussion on the proofs of existence of pure lands (a fragmental section).
- Section 8: Comparison between four-part and three-part models of cognition in Yogācāra Buddhism.
- Section 9: Critical reviews of the proofs on the existence of the eighth consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) in Asvabhāva’s commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*.
- Section 10: Critical reviews of the proof of the eighth consciousness, demonstrated in the *Cheng weishi lun*.
- Section 11: Discussion on nine kinds of reasons (九句因).
- Section 12: Metalogical discussion on the antinomic reason.
- Section 13: Discussion on the proof of the five-*gotra* theory.
- Section 14: Discussion on problems of nonexistence of *ātman* and *dharmā* by the *Cheng weishi lun* (a fragmental section).

There are fragments of other topics whose numbers are unknown, such as a critical discussion on Xuanzang’s proof of consciousness-only.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, it should be noted that the *P'an p'iryang non* is not a text of thought but of logic. In other words, Wōnhyo seems to focus only on logical problems where in

some sections he discusses the logical validity of thoughts being different from his own. For instance, in the thirteenth section, *P'an p'iryang non* tries to prove the existence of sentient beings who are lacking in the nature of Buddhahood; however, Wŏnhyo is regarded as a master who believed in the universal Buddhahood of all sentient beings.<sup>13</sup>

As mentioned above, the twelfth part of *P'an p'iryang non* discusses the logical problem of antinomic reason (*\*viruddhāvyaḥcārin*). Antinomic reason is one of the fallacies of reason of the three-part syllogism, in which two opposing syllogisms with valid reasons argued by the proponent and opponent result in becoming mutually incompatible propositions, and neither can be decided to be true. It may be presumed that Wŏnhyo had a keen interest in the antinomic reason since the tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth sections, as well as the fragments criticizing Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only, which also discusses the problems of inferences with the antinomic reason. In addition, it is possible to think that antinomic reason characterizes a part (or a way) of Wŏnhyo's philosophy of harmonization (Kor. *hwajaeng* 和諍) because—although it is extremely fragmented—Wŏnhyo's *Simmun hwajaeng non* 十門和諍論 uses the term *jueding xiangwei* 決定相違 several times.<sup>14</sup>

It has been claimed that antinomic reason is important when thinking about one of the logical characteristics of Dignāgan logic.<sup>15</sup> Dignāga and the NP, however, categorize antinomic reason as one of the six fallacies of inconclusive reason (Ch. *buding yin* 不定因), so it has been questioned whether the categorization is valid by current scholars such as Moriyama as follows:

Dignāga, considered the founder of Buddhist logic, classifies the fallacious reason called “antinomic” (*viruddhāvyaḥcārin*) as an “inconclusive” reason (*anaikāntika*). It takes a unique position, however, within the group of “inconclusive” reasons: whereas the inconclusive nature of the others is based on their not fulfilling the three characteristics of a valid logical reason (*trairūpya*, 因三相), the antinomic reason does fulfill the three characteristics. Why, then, is it considered an “inconclusive” reason? (Moriyama 2014, 122)

Among modern scholars, there is also a difference of opinion considering categorization as logical or not. On the one hand, based on his mathematical formalization of the antinomic reason, Ueda states that it “has its logical root in Dignāgan logic of the three conditions of *hetu*” (2008, 101). On the other

hand, Ono claims that Dignāga's categorization is logically unreasonable, and the antinomic reason should consider that "Dignāga approved of the plurality of the scriptures' beliefs and strove to build a valid logic in such a multi-belief situation" (2010, 134).

Premodern Buddhist logicians, such as Mun'gwe, also pointed out the same problem about categorization. It is interesting that Wōnhyo seems to try to solve the problem (meta-)logically in the *P'an p'iryang non*. In other words, using the three-part syllogism, Wōnhyo attempts to prove that the antinomic reason should be considered an inconclusive reason.

## Textual Problem

Before examining the content, it will be useful to discuss the textual reliability of the twelfth section of *P'an p'iryang non*. This section is preserved in a manuscript of Otani University and can be transcribed as follows:

十二 相違決定立二比量。又軌法師自作問答「問。具足三相應是正因。何故此中而言不定。答。此疑未決、不敢解之。有通釋者、隨而爲注。此中間意立比量云、  
(1)違決中因應是正因、具三相故、如餘真因。今者通曰、(2)違決之因非正因攝、有等難故、如相違因。由此顯彼有不定過。(3)又此二因非相違攝、同品有故、猶如正因。(4)又此二因非不成攝、是共許故、如不共因。(5)如是二因不定因攝、非正非違非不成故、如餘五種不定因也。六量 [A translation appears later.]

We can find only five inferences, (1) to (5); however, the text mentions "six inferences" (六量) at the end of the section. It is unreasonable that Fukihara (1967, 20–21) counts the phrase "two inferences" of the beginning sentence (相違決定立二比量) as one of the six inferences. This sentence means none other than that antinomic reason requires two inferences with valid reasons.<sup>16</sup>

Significantly, Zenju (723–797), one of the most eminent scholar monks of the Japanese Yogācāra (Hossō) school and of Buddhist logic, quotes the same part as follows:

判比量云、此中間意、立比量云、(1)違決中因應是正因、具三相故、如餘真因。今者通曰、(2)違決之因非正因攝、有等難故、如相違因。由此顯彼有不定過。  
(3)又此二因非相違攝、同品有故、猶如正因。(3)又此二因非相違攝、同品有故、

猶如正因。<sup>(4)</sup>又此二因非不成攝、是共許故、如不共因。<sup>(5)</sup>如是二因不定因攝、非正非違非不成故、如餘五種不定因也。<sup>已上</sup><sup>17</sup>

The underlined part shows that the same sentence (又此二因非相違攝、同品有故、猶如正因) is repeated. It is, however, possible to consider the repetition as a mistake in writing (so that the source manuscript of Zenju's text should be confirmed),<sup>18</sup> it could also be possible to regard the repetition as a trace of the lost sixth inference:<sup>19</sup>

- (1) 違決中因應是正因、具三相故、如餘真因。
- (2) 違決之因非正因攝、有等難故、如相違因。
- (3) 又此二因非相違攝、同品有故、猶如正因。
- (3') 又此二因非相違攝、同品有故、猶如正因。
- (4) 又此二因非不成攝、是共許故、如不共因。
- (5) 如是二因不定因攝、非正非違非不成故、如餘五種不定因。

Needless to say, this is meaningless as it is because the inferences (3) and (3') are identical. For example, however, the inference (3') could be revised as follows since the three conditions of the valid reason (*trairūpya*) in Dignāgan logic should include not only *sapakṣe sattvaṃ* (同品有; the reason must be present in similar instances) but also *vipakṣe asattvaṃ* (異品無; the reason must be absent from dissimilar instances). However, there is no direct evidence to do so:<sup>20</sup>

- (1) 違決中因應是正因、具三相故、如餘真因。
- (2) 違決之因非正因攝、有等難故、如相違因。
- (3) 又此二因非相違攝、同品有故、猶如正因。
- (3') 又此二因非相違攝、異品無故、猶如正因。
- (4) 又此二因非不成攝、是共許故、如不共因。
- (5) 如是二因不定因攝、非正非違非不成故、如餘五種不定因。

Although apparently this reconstruction would be logically and textually better than the extant descriptions, it needs to be emphasized that it indicates only one of the hypotheses and suggest that the textual criticism of this section should be continued.

## Wŏnhyo's Solution

### The structure of the twelfth section

The following is a translation<sup>21</sup> of the twelfth section found in the Otani manuscript of *P'an p'iryang non*:

12. [When demonstrating the fallacy of] the antinomic reason, two inferences are formed. Dharma master Mun'gwe composed the following question and answer:

Question: [A reason] that fulfills [the requirements of] the three conditions of the valid reason (\**trairūpya*) should be a true reason. Why, in this context, are [the reasons of the two inferences] called inconclusive (不定)?

Answer: The doubt has been unsolved so I dare not explain it. A commentator annotated it as he thought proper.<sup>22</sup>

The intent of this question can be expressed as an inference [as follows]:

- (1) [Thesis] The reasons in [two inferences of] the antinomic reason should be [considered as] valid reasons.  
[Reason] Because they fulfill the three conditions [of the valid reason]  
[Example] Just like other true reasons

Now [I try to] answer [the unsolved question]:

- (2) [Thesis] The reasons of [two inferences of] the antinomic reason are not classified as true reasons.  
[Reason] Because they have equal [abilities] to criticize [each other] (等難)<sup>23</sup>  
[Example] Like contradictory reasons (相違因)

From this, it becomes clear that [the reasons] have the fallacy of being inconclusive [as follows]:

- (3) [Thesis] These two reasons are not classified as contradictory [reasons].  
[Reason] Because [each of them] is present in similar instances

[Example] Like true reasons

- (4) [Thesis] These two reasons are not classified as unaccepted [reasons] (不成).  
 [Reason] Because [separately] they are accepted [as valid inferences] by both parties  
 [Example] Like the “too restricted” reasons (不共因)

Therefore,

- (5) [Thesis] The two reasons are classified as inconclusive reasons.  
 [Reason] Because they are not true [based on (2)], not contradictory [based on (3)], and not unaccepted [based on (4)]  
 [Example] Like the other five types of inconclusive reasons

Six inferences.

Quoting Mun’gwe’s commentary on the NP or the IS, Wōnhyo raises a question why the reasons in two inferences of the antinomic reason are classified as inconclusive,<sup>24</sup> although, like the other true (valid) reasons, they satisfy the three conditions of the valid reasons. Because Mun’gwe also refers to an unknown “commentator,”<sup>25</sup> it is reasonable to say that this problem was discussed among Xuanzang’s disciples, while Mun’gwe seems to suspend his judgment.

The rule of Buddhist logic requires each reason to be classified as one of the following: true (valid) reason, four unaccepted reasons, six inconclusive reasons, or four contradictory reasons. In the inference (5), Wōnhyo tries to prove that the antinomic reason should be classified as one of the inconclusive reasons since they are not true reasons according to (2), not contradictory reasons based on (3), and not unaccepted reasons because of (4). We can conjecture that Wōnhyo used a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*.

### Tautological redefinition of the principle of the antinomic reason

Although Wōnhyo’s purpose is to prove that the antinomic reason should be classified into inconclusive reasons, the quotation above holds some points to discuss. The inference (1) shows a translation of Mun’gwe’s question into

the three-part syllogism of Buddhist logic (*yinming*). Wōnhyo formulates the inference (2) that fulfills the three conditions of the valid reason and whose proposition contradicts (1) to show that the reason of (1) has the fallacy of the antinomic reason.<sup>26</sup> It is reasonable to suppose that inferences (1) and (2) are paraphrases of the principle of antinomic reason; namely, the two reasons that fulfill the three conditions and two propositions being contradictory to each other.<sup>27</sup> So, (1) and (2) could be rewritten as follows:

- For any reason  $h$  ( $b$ ) of the antinomic reason:
- $h$  ( $b$ ) is valid because it fulfills the three conditions of the valid reason.
- $h$  ( $b$ ) is not valid because it has an equivalent and incompatible reason  $h'$  ( $b$ ).
- ∴ Therefore,  $h$  ( $b$ ) of the antinomic reason is of the antinomic reason.

It is reasonable to say that (1) and (2) show a tautological redefinition of antinomic reason using the form of a three-part syllogism. That is to say, they seem to be a proof by transforming the principle of antinomic reason. Regardless of the intention of Wōnhyo, it may be presumed that his metalogical argument indicates a nature of his Buddhist logic.<sup>28</sup>

According to the principle of Buddhist logic, a tautology could be regarded as a fallacy because it has no capability to change the opponent's mind. Kuiji describes the fallacy of both-agreement (Ch. *xiangfu jicheng* 相符極成; Skt. \**prasiddha-saṃbandha*) as follows:

NP states that [the fallacy of] *xiangfu jicheng* is [shown in a proposition like] “sound is audible.” ... This [proposition] shows no effect. [The reason why a proponent] argues a proposition against the opponent is essentially to dispute between the same [opinion with the proponent] and the different [opinion of the opponent]. A proposition agreed by both [the proponent and opponent in advance] is not useful in making the discussion a success. Whenever arguing “sound is audible” against any opponents, both [the proponent and opponent] must agree with it.<sup>29</sup>

Although “sound is audible” might not be a tautology, a tautological proposition like “A of B is of B” also has no effect on a discussion between two parties in a conflict. I think we should consider logically whether or not Wōnhyo's perspective of Buddhist logic was different from Kuiji's or what

was espoused in the NP, and had logical consistency in his own system of reasoning.

### The winner in antinomic reason

In the context of antinomic reason, the proponent argues a three-part syllogism first and, then, the opponent forms a contradictory syllogism. According to Mun'gwe, in this case, the proponent loses, and the opponent wins as in the following:

Question: The proponent argues, and the opponent objects [using the antinomic reason] whether the logic [of the proponent] is valid or not. When both lose validity [because of the antinomic reason], can neither win?

Answer: [In this case,] the before [the proponent] loses and the after [the opponent] wins, like [a situation in the game of *go*] where the first player capturing [the second player's stone(s) certainly loses her stone(s)] in the next step.<sup>30</sup> [The case is also similar to a rule in wrestling:] When [two] wrestlers are equal [in strength] and are never knocked down [by each other], the one declaring victory before the other will be regarded as the loser.<sup>31</sup>

Kitagawa (1965, 204) states that in Dignāgan logic, the antinomic reason becomes applicable when the proponent's argument is based on a flawed doctrine such as the one that is inconsistent with the direct observation. In other words, the antinomic reason is unusable when a reason based on a correct doctrine is argued by the proponent. Kitagawa also points out that this description is based on Dignāga's tacit understanding that all that exist logically harmonize each other. Mun'gwe's "the 'before' loses and the 'after' wins" seems to be identical to Dignāga's perception of the antinomic reason. Being not based on a logical ground but on some kind of beliefs or common sense, Dignāga and Mun'gwe regard the proponent as the loser in the context of the antinomic reason.

Criticizing Mun'gwe's interpretation, Kuiji claims that the opponent does not win and both syllogisms of the proponent and opponent are not valid but inconclusive.<sup>32</sup> Although Wōnhyo's perspective is unclear; because Wōnhyo's demonstration in (3), (4), and (5) assumes that (2) is valid; it is reasonable to suppose that he does not borrow from Kuiji's interpretation. According

to Kuiji, the opponent forms a contradictory syllogism only to invalidate the proponent's syllogism—not to demonstrate his own argument in the syllogism—and (2) is not valid in this context.

## Conclusion

Methodologically, a historical system of logic should be examined from both a non-historical perspective and a historical context. A logical system is expected to apply apart from historicity under a universal rule or law, while it was constructed within the historical context. Ueda says, “Dignāga’s logic may not necessarily work as he expected.... Understanding the purpose or motive of Dignāgan logic is insufficient to comprehend it. Therefore, the way of understanding a thought historically is not identical to that of understanding the logic” (2001, 6). Likewise, there is a possibility that the logic described in *P'an p'iryang non* will not work in accordance with Wŏnhyo’s perspective of Buddhist logic.

This paper has overviewed the twelfth section of *P'an p'iryang non*. Some textual problems remain in the section preserved in the Otani manuscript. Moreover, the analysis would need further textual criticism. Regarding the logical aspect of the section, Wŏnhyo tried to solve the problem of the categorization of antinomic reason through a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* method. Thus, he transformed the principle of antinomic reason and showed a tautological redefinition, which probably is in conflict with the rule of the fallacy of both-agreement defined in the YDS. According to these points, Wŏnhyo’s perspective of the antinomic reason seems to resemble the standpoint of Mun’gwe more rather than that of Kuiji.

These points found in the short descriptions of *P'an p'iryang non* probably express the features of Wŏnhyo’s logic and not of his logical misinterpretation. We should be more prudent in understanding Wŏnhyo’s intention in composing this work or each section. For example, based on these characteristics, we should not claim that Wŏnhyo criticized Kuiji’s logic, and so forth. Nonetheless, from these points, we can advance to need an even more detailed examinations of *P'an p'iryang non* from the viewpoints of textual criticism and logic.

## Notes

- 1 Unlike Indian logicians, East Asian Buddhist logicians have not been interested in the theory of *jāti* described in the *Nyāyamukha*, because the NP has no description of *jāti* (Moro 2015b). It should be noted that Xuanzang's followers knew the theory of *apoha* (Katsura 2014), although Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* which discussed the *apoha* theory was not translated into Chinese.
- 2 Ishii (1990) and Lee (1999) regard Mun'gwe as a Silla scholar monk.
- 3 Based on the criticism of the biographies of Xuanzang, I consider it dubious that he demonstrated the proof of consciousness-only in India (Moro 2015a).
- 4 Following the standpoint of Moro (2015a), Moriyama (2017; 2018) reinterprets the four kinds of contradictory reasons in the YDS.
- 5 Because of the progress of research on Mun'gwe's texts, such as Moro (2017) and Tang Mingjun's article in the current issue, the interpretations of Moro (2015a) should be revised.
- 6 It seems important that Wōnhyo wrote some commentaries on the controversy over emptiness and existence in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools. According to ancient catalogs of Buddhist scriptures, Wōnhyo wrote commentaries on Bhāviveka's *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論 or the *Jewel in the Hand* (*Changjillon chongyo* 掌珍論宗要 and *Changjillon yogan* 掌珍論料簡) and Dharmapāla's *Dasheng guanbailun shilun* 大乘廣百論釋論 (more specifically, the *Kwangbaengnon chongyo* 廣百論宗要, *Kwangbaengnon ch'waryo* 廣百論撮要, and *Kwangbaengnon chigwi* 廣百論旨歸). Because, as shown in Moro (2015a), the logical validities and similarities in the proofs argued in *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* and *Dasheng guanbailun shilun*, as well as in Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only were discussed in the controversies of East Asian Buddhist logic, it is appropriate that *Kegon shū shōsho narabini inmyō roku* 華嚴宗章疏并因明錄, one of the ancient catalogs, regarded the *Kwangbaengnon ch'waryo* as a work of Buddhist logic (T 55, no. 2177, 1134c29).
- 7 There remain many fragments of old handwriting (Jp. *kobitsu gire* 古筆切) similar to the manuscripts of *P'an piryang non*, which are written in non-joined cursive style, traditionally ascribed to Kūkai (774–835), the founder of the Japanese esoteric Buddhist school, *Shingon shū*, and one of the greatest calligraphers in Japan. These remaining fragments consisted mostly the works of Wōnhyo and Wōnch'ūk (Moro 2019).
- 8 Currently, the fragments of Kanda Kiichirō are owned by Otani University (Miyazaki 1995).
- 9 In 2017, several newly found fragments were introduced in a special exhibition of Kanagawa prefectural Kanazawa-Bunko museum (Dōtsu 2017). An international joint conference to discuss these manuscripts was held by the museum and Dongguk University (Dōtsu 2018). Moreover, on November 30, 2018, the international conference titled “Wōnhyo *P'an piryang non*, munhōngwa sasangūi chaejomyōng” 원효「판비량론」, 문헌과 사상의 재조명 [Wōnhyo's *P'an piryang non*: Reillumination of the Text and the

Thought] was organized and other fragments were also introduced.

- 10 Based on the fragments of *P'an p'iryang non* quoted in Japanese texts, Moro (2018a) deals with Wōnhyo's discussion to prove the authenticity of the Mahāyāna scriptures.
- 11 自語相違者, 如言我母是其石女 (NP, T 32, no. 1630, 11c2–3).
- 12 See Moro (2015a), Kim (2017), and Okamoto (2018). See also Tang Mingjun's article in this issue.
- 13 See Fukihara (1967, 62). For example, comparing with Kuiji, Kitsukawa (2003) states that Wōnhyo emphasized that the omnipresence of Buddha nature made all sentient beings to become Buddhas.
- 14 Muller (2008) regards the *Simmun hwajaeng non* as a treatise on logic and points out structures similar to the *P'an p'iryang non*.
- 15 See Ueda (2008), Ono (2010), and Moriyama (2014).
- 16 For example, the NP shows the following two inferences: “Sound is not permanent, because of being produced, like a pot” (聲是無常, 所作性故, 譬如瓶等) and “Sound is permanent, because of being audible, like sound-hood” (聲常, 所聞性故, 譬如聲性) (T 32, no. 1630, 12a12–14).
- 17 Zenju 善珠, *Inmyō ron sho myōtōshō* 因明論疏明燈抄 (T 68, no. 2270, 362c11–19).
- 18 For example, Zōshun 藏俊 (1104–1180) also quotes the twelfth part in his *Inmyō daisho shō* 因明大疏抄 (T 68, no. 2271, 569a9–19), which has only five inferences like the Otani manuscript.
- 19 Lusthaus claims that Zenju's quotation “suggest[s] corruption in our manuscript version” (Lusthaus 2012, 374, n. 81).
- 20 Similar expressions can be found in Shentai's 神泰 *Limenlun shuji* 理門論述記, a commentary on the *Nyāyamukha*, and the eleventh section of *P'an p'iryang non*. Shentai introduced two inferences to demonstrate that the reason of \*Śabdavāda's (声論) argument “Sound is permanent, because of audibility” posed against the Buddhists is not inconclusive:  
 所聞性因非不定攝宗, 異品無故因, 猶如正因喻. 又所聞性因非不定攝宗, 同品無故因, 如故(相?)違因喻 (T 44, no. 1839, 88a6–7).  
 The reason “audibility” is not included in inconclusive reasons. Because it is absent from dissimilar instances. Like true reasons, the reason “audibility” is also not included in inconclusive reasons. Because it is present in similar instances like contradictory reasons. Wōnhyo also introduces almost the same inferences in the beginning of the eleventh section and analyzes them.
- 21 For this translation, Lusthaus (2012) was helpful but my interpretation is different from his.
- 22 問. 具足三相, 應是正因. 何故此中而言不定. 答. 此疑未決, 不敢解之. 有通釋者隨空而注 (IS 2; Zhina neixueyuan 1977, 3(4); Shen 2008, 362). According to the context, the expression 隨而 in the *P'an p'iryang non* would be better than the 隨空 of the IS.
- 23 The word 等難 is also used in the tenth part of *P'an p'iryang non*. It seems to mean that

two inferences of the antinomic reason have equivalent (等) capacities of demonstration since they fulfill the three conditions of the valid reason, and they criticize (難) each other since their propositions are incompatible. See Muroya (2017).

24 不定有六. 一共, 二不共, 三同品一分轉異品遍轉, 四異品一分轉同品遍轉, 五俱品一分轉, 六相違決定 (NP, T 32, no. 1630, 11c17–19).

25 Although the dates of the birth and death of Xuanzang's disciples are almost unknown, Shentai could be a candidate of the “commentator” since he also regards an inference with the antinomic reason as an inconclusive reason in his commentary of the *Nyāyamukha*:

然衛世, 於聲論立量之時, 相違決定, 必定可得故. 所聞因量, 是不定也 (T 44, no. 1839, 89a5–6).

When a \*Śābdavāda follower argues an inference [like “Sound is permanent, because of being audible, like sound-hood”], [an inference with] the antinomic reason [like “Sound is not permanent, because of being produced, like a pot”] made by a \*Vaiśeṣika advocate must be valid. [Therefore], the inference with the reason “audible” [made by \*Śābdavāda] is inconclusive.

26 According to Ueda (2008), when there are the following two inferences that result in the antinomic reason,

(A1) There exists S in p because of H (“p 是 S, H 故” in *yinming* style).

(A2) There exists T in p because of G (“p 是 T, G 故”).

the following conditions are satisfied:

i. H and G fulfill the three conditions of the valid reason (*trairūpya*).

ii. S and T are incompatible (*virodha*).

iii. p is the only locus (*dharmin*) that has both H and G.

The inferences (1) and (2) of *P'an p'iryang non* can be transformed as follows:

(1) There exists validness [S] in a reason of the antinomic reason [p] because of the fulfilment of the three conditions [H].

(2) There exists invalidness [T] in a reason of the antinomic reason [p] because of an equivalent criticism [G].

These inferences satisfy the following conditions:

i. H and G fulfill the three conditions of the valid reason.

a) A reason of the antinomic reason [p] fulfills the three conditions [H] (by definition) and has an equivalent criticism [G].

b) Whatever (except p) fulfills the three conditions [H], it is a valid reason [S]. Whatever (except p) has an equivalent criticism [G], it is not a valid reason [T].

c) Whatever (except p) is not a valid reason [~S], it does not fulfill the three conditions [~H]. Whatever (except p) is a valid reason [~T], it does not have any equivalent criticisms [~G].

ii. Validness [S] and invalidness [T] are incompatible.

iii. The reason of the antinomic reason is the only locus (*dharmin*) that has both the

fulfillment of the three conditions [H] and an equivalent criticism [G].

- 27 Cf. 具三相因, 各自決定, 成相違之宗, 名相違決定 (YDS, T 1840, no. 44, 126a21–22).
- 28 Moro (2015a, 109) points out that Wōnhyo seems to use a logical operation like De Morgan's laws to interpret Xuanzang's proof of consciousness-only, while it is not clear whether De Morgan's laws are valid, if any, in the general system of Buddhist logic.
- 29 論相符極成者如說聲是所聞...此顯虛功. 對敵申宗, 本諍同異. 依宗兩順, 枉費成功. 凡對所敵立聲所聞, 必相符故 (YDS, T 44, no. 1840, 118c15–19).
- 30 According to Nemu (1985), this is presumed to be a situation like *seki* 七キ (Ch. *shuanghuo* 双活) of the Japanese game of *go*.
- 31 問. 主立賓破, 理有是非, 豈容俱失而無勝負. 答. 前負後勝, 如先煞遲棋. 又如人相撲, 力停不倒, 先言我勝, 此即墮負 (IS 2; Zhina neixueyuan 1977, 3(4); Shen 2008, 361).
- 32 非諸決定相違, 皆先負後勝. 若爾便決定, 云何名不定. 由此論主恐謂一切決定相違皆後為勝, 故結之云二俱不定 (YDS, T 44, no. 1840, 126c17–19).

## Abbreviations

- IS *Inmyōng ipchōngi ron so* 因明入正理論疏 [Commentary on the NP] by Mun'gwe (Ch. Wengui) (Shen 2008, Takemura 1986, Zhina neixueyuan 1977).
- NP *Yinming ruzhengli lun* 因明入正理論 [Xuanzang's translation of *Niyāyapraveśaka*], T 32, no. 1630.
- YDS *Yinming ruzhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏 [Commentary on the NP]; a.k.a. *Yinming dashu* 因明大疏 [Great Commentary on the NP]. By Kuiji (632–682). T 44, no. 1840.

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