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Wŏnhyo's Antinomic Inference and Wengui*

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Abstract

In the history of the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic, Wōnhyo 元曉 is famous for his antinomic inference directed against Xuanzang's inference of consciousness-only. Recently, studies by Shigeki Moro (2017) have brought to light the close relation between Wengui 文軌 and Wōnhyo. By examining the passage from Wengui found by Moro and related materials, I attempt to reveal some new facts concerning the relation between Wengui and Wōnhyo. In short, Wōnhyo's antinomic inference was known to Wengui, as he has offered a criticism on it. Furthermore, Zenju 善珠 in his Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō 因明論疏明燈抄 cites a passage from Wōnhyo's P'an piryang non 判比量論, which shows that Wengui's criticism was known to Wōnhyo because Wōnhyo response. The point of Wōnhyo's counter is that his inference will be free from fault, as pointed out by Wengui, if the property to be proven in his inference is reformulated into the condition of being separate from the visual consciousness that is well established (離極成眼識). Lastly, I entertain the hypothesis that the former part of Wengui's Yinming ru zhengli lun shu 因明入正理論疏, which is actually the source of Wōnhyo's knowledge of the inference of consciousness-only was written before the arrival of the antinomic inference in China, while the last part of this same work, which contains criticism of the antinomic inference, was written after the arrival of the antinomic inference.

Key words: Buddhist logic, Wōnhyo, wengui, P'an piryang non, inference of consciousness-only

Introduction

In the history of the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic, Wōnhyo 元曉 (617–686) is famous for his “antinomic inference” (*jueding xiangwei liang* 決定相違量; *xiangwei jueding liang* 相違決定量) directed against Xuanzang's 玄奘 (602–664) inference of consciousness-only (*weishi biliang* 唯識比量).

Wōnhyo's own exposition of the antinomic inference is found in one fragment of his *P'an piryang non* 判比量論 (PPRN) as cited by Zenju 善珠 (723–797) in his *Inmyō ronsbo myōtō shō* 因明論疏明燈抄 (IRMS 321a17–b5).¹ By comparing this fragment with Wengui's 文軌 (ca. 615–675)² interpretation of the inference of consciousness-only in his *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏 (ZYS 2.21b2–22a10; Ci IDS 530a18–b11), I find that Wōnhyo's exposition of the antinomic inference follows not only the structure of presenting the inference of consciousness-only in *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (ZYS), but also the terminology which is unique to this ZYS passage. As is well known, Wōnhyo's antinomic inference is closely modeled upon Xuanzang's inference in terms of the underlying pattern of argumentation and the use of qualifications (*viśeṣaṇa*, Ch. *jian bie* 簡別). We now can identify the version of this model that Wōnhyo has adopted for his antinomic inference, and also exactly with the model in Wengui's interpretation. In this way Wengui has been a strong influence at a time when Wōnhyo conceptualized the argumentation of his antinomic inference (Tang 2018, 154, 194–195).

As is also well known, Kuiji 窺基 (632–682) vehemently criticized the antinomic inference in his *Yinming dashu* 因明大疏 (YMDS 347–351 = T 44, no. 1840, 116a15–b11)³ when it arrived in China. Although Kuiji wrongly ascribes the antinomic inference to Sun'gyōng 順憬 (fl. seventh century), another Silla scholar-monk, Kuiji's critical analysis of the antinomic inference became well-known and central in the East Asian tradition of Buddhist logic. However, recent studies by Moro (2017) draw our attention to one previously less-examined passage from Wengui's *Yinminglun limen shisi guolei shu* 因明論理門十四過類疏 (YLSGS). In this passage (see below Source 1), Wengui provides a critique of the antinomic inference. Wengui's criticism is different from that of Kuiji and seems to be much earlier. The existence of Wengui's critical inquiry calls into question the date of the arrival of the antinomic inference in China and Kuiji's narration thereof.

In what follows, I begin with a brief appraisal of Wōnhyo's antinomic

inference, explaining why this inference is tenable and indeed constitutes a counterargument against Xuanzang's inference of consciousness-only. Then, I will reexamine Wengui's examination of the antinomic inference (Source 1), which is at first studied by Moro (2017). By relating Wengui's criticism to other materials (Sources 2 and 3), I bring to light the exchanges of views between Wengui and Wōnhyo concerning the latter's antinomic inference. Because these exchanges between Wengui and Wōnhyo were previously less known, I will try to base my argument on textual evidences. I conclude this paper with a chronology of the relationship between Wengui and Wōnhyo.

Wōnhyo's Antinomic Inference: A Brief Appraisal

An inference is deemed "antinomic" based on the condition when "[its reason does] not deviate with respect to [a conclusion that is] contradictory" to the conclusion of the original inference that this new inference is drawn against. The reason (*hetu*, Ch. *yin* 因⁴) of Wōnhyo's antinomic inference fulfills the three characteristics (*trirūpa*) of a correct reason, and "does not deviate," just as the reason of Xuanzang's inference fulfills the same three characteristics, as proclaimed by his disciples, e.g. Wengui and Kuiji. Xuanzang's inference runs as follows:

Thesis: From the standpoint of ultimate truth (*zhengtu* 真故), the visual form (*rūpa*) that is well established (*prasiddha*, Ch. *jicheng* 極成) is certainly not separate from visual consciousness (*caḥsurvijñāna*) (真故極成色, 定不離於眼識).

Reason: Because, although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept (*zixu* 自許), [it] is not included in the visual sense (*caḥsus*, Ch. *yan* 眼) (i.e. the visual faculty [*caḥsurindriya*, Ch. *yan gen* 眼根]) (自許初三攝, 眼所不攝故).

Example: It is like visual consciousness (猶如眼識).⁵

Following Franco's (2004) interpretation of Xuanzang's inference, we can also explain the fulfillment of the three characteristics in the case of Wōnhyo's antinomic inference, which runs as follows:

Thesis: From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is certainly separate from visual consciousness (真故極成色,

定離於眼識).

Reason: Because, although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in visual consciousness (自許初三攝, 眼識不攝故).

Example: It is like the visual faculty (猶如眼根).⁶

Just like Xuanzang's inference, Wŏnhyo's inference also uses the terminology of the eighteen *dhātus* ("elements," Ch. *jie* 界) as outlined below.

1. 眼 "visual sense"	2. 色 "visual form"	3. 眼識 "visual consciousness"
4. 耳 "auditory sense"	5. 聲 "sound"	6. 耳識 "auditory consciousness"
7. 鼻 "olfactory sense"	8. 香 "odor"	9. 鼻識 "olfactory consciousness"
10. 舌 "gustatory sense"	11. 味 "flavor"	12. 舌識 "gustatory consciousness"
13. 身 "tactile sense"	14. 觸 "the tangible"	15. 身識 "tactile consciousness"
16. 意 "mentation"	17. 法 "mental objects"	18. 意識 "mental consciousness"

[Figure 1] The eighteen *dhātus* (Franco 2004, 208)

According to so-called "tripartitionism," or the threefold division of the universe of discourse in Dignāga's (ca. 480–540) logic into *pakṣa* ("subject of inference," Ch. *zong* 宗), *sapakṣa* ("similar instance," Ch. *tongpin* 同品) and *vipakṣa* ("dissimilar instance," Ch. *yipin* 異品),⁷ we have the following division of the universe of discourse in the case of Wŏnhyo's inference.

<i>pakṣa</i> :	<i>dhātu</i> no. 2;
<i>sapakṣa</i> :	<i>dhātus</i> nos. 1 and 4–18; They are the group of things that exhibit the property to be proven (<i>sādhyadharmā</i> , Ch. <i>suo li fa</i> 所立法), i.e. "being certainly separate from visual consciousness."
<i>vipakṣa</i> :	<i>dhātu</i> no. 3. Visual consciousness itself is the only thing that does not exhibit the property to be proven, because visual consciousness is not separate from itself.

[Figure 2] The *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* of Wŏnhyo's Inference

With respect to the reason of Wōnhyo’s inference, “being included in the first three [*dhātus*]” amounts to the condition of being included in the group of *dhātus* nos. 1–3. “Being not included in visual consciousness” amounts to the condition of not being *dhātu* no. 3. The reason of Wōnhyo’s inference, being a conjunction of these two conditions, expresses simply the property of being either *dhātu* no. 1 or no. 2. The reason of Wōnhyo’s inference fulfills the following three characteristics:

(1)	The first characteristic, i.e. the reason being (pervasively) a property of the <i>paḥṣa</i> (<i>paḥṣadharmaṭvam</i> , Ch. <i>bian shi zongfaxing</i> 遍是宗法性), because <i>dhātu</i> no. 2 exhibits the property of being either <i>dhātu</i> no. 1 or no. 2;
(2)	The second characteristic, i.e. the reason being (certainly) present in <i>sapaḥṣa</i> (<i>sapaḥṣe sattvam</i> , Ch. <i>tongpin ding youxing</i> 同品定有性), because <i>dhātu</i> no. 1, belonged to the <i>sapaḥṣa</i> set, exhibits the property of being either <i>dhātu</i> no. 1 or no. 2;
(3)	And the third characteristic, i.e. the reason being (pervasively) absent from <i>vipaḥṣa</i> (<i>vipaḥṣe cāsattvam</i> , Ch. <i>yipin bian wuxing</i> 異品遍無性), because <i>dhātu</i> no. 3 is neither <i>dhātu</i> no. 1 nor no. 2.

[Figure 3] Three Characteristics in Wōnhyo’s Inference

Thus, Wōnhyo’s inference fulfills the same three characteristics as those that are fulfilled in the case of Xuanzang’s inference. According to the rules of Buddhist logic, both inferences should be invalidated when they equally fulfill the three characteristics but result in conclusions contradictory to each other. Therefore, proving the correctness of Wōnhyo’s inference with regard to the three characteristics will invalidate Xuanzang’s inference. In other words, when faced with a counter-inference which is equally correct, then this invalidates the first inference.

Wengui’s Criticism of the Antinomic Inference

Source 1 (ZYS 4.3b9–4b2 = YLSGS 436c22–437a8):

(1) 問：如立量云：「真故極成色，非定離眼識」宗，「自許初三攝、眼根不攝故」因，

「如眼識喻。有人破此比量，作相違決定云：「真故極成色，定離於眼識宗，「自許初三攝、眼識不攝故」因，「如眼根」喻。此四句中何句所攝？(3b9-4a3 = 436c22-26)

Question: For instance, [one may] set forth the following inference:

Thesis: From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is not certainly separate from the visual consciousness.

Reason: Because, although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in the visual faculty.

Example: It is like visual consciousness.⁸

Someone makes the following refutation of the [above] inference [by means of an antinomic inference based on a reason] that does not deviate with respect to [a conclusion which is] contradictory [to the conclusion of the above inference]:

Thesis: From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is certainly separate from visual consciousness.

Reason: Because, although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in visual consciousness.

Example: It is like the visual faculty.⁹

In which category (*ju* 句) of the four categories [of refutation]¹⁰ is this refutation included?

(2) 答：此當第四「以不定破定」句攝，以眼根非同品故。謂小乘宗自許眼根定離眼識。(4a3-4 = 436c26-27)

Answer: This should be included in the fourth category, i.e. using [an] inconclusive [reason] to refute [a] conclusive [one]. [This is] because the visual faculty is not [a] *sapaṅśa* [member]. That is, it is accepted [only] in the Hinayāna doctrine that the visual faculty is certainly separate from visual consciousness.

(3) 若大乘自在菩薩六識互用，眼識亦得緣彼眼根，現眼相分。及成所作智，亦緣眼根，現眼相分。(4a4-6 = 436c27-437a2)

In the case of a Mahāyāna bodhisattva [with] unimpeded [abilities for] using one of the six forms of consciousness in place of another (*liushi buyong* 六識互用), visual consciousness can also apprehend the visual faculty and manifest the appearance-aspect (*xiangfen* 相分) of the visual sense (i.e. the visual faculty). In addition, the cognition of achieving the task can also apprehend the visual faculty and manifest the appearance-aspect of the visual sense.

(4) 如此相分眼根，並是初三之中眼根所攝。此則大乘不許眼根定離眼識。(4a6-8 = 437a2-4)

Both of the above two forms of visual faculty [manifested in the consciousness] as an appearance-aspect are included in the [category of] visual faculty in the first

three [*dhātus*]. Therefore, that the visual faculty is certainly separate from visual consciousness is not accepted by Mahāyāna [scholars].

(5) 此之眼根，望自雖是同品，望他即是異品。然無共同品故，是同品無。以眼識爲異品，因復非有。此「自許初三攝、眼識不攝」因，於同、異品，既遍非有，即六不定中不共不定也。(4a8-b1 = 437a4-7)

[Hence,] the visual faculty in this case (i.e. in the case of the above antinomic inference), although being [a] *sapakṣa* [member] with respect to themselves (Hīnayāna scholars), is indeed [a] *vipakṣa* [member] with respect to others (Mahāyāna scholars). However, because there is no *sapakṣa* [member] that is equally [accepted],¹¹ [the reason of the above antinomic inference] is not present in *sapakṣa*. [Furthermore,] visual consciousness is used as *vipakṣa* [in the above antinomic inference]. The reason is also not present [in it]. This reason, “being not included in visual consciousness, although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept,” is present in neither *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*. Hence, [the reason] is inconclusive because it is uncommon [to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*] in [the classification of] the six inconclusive [reasons].

(6) 復是似喻中他隨一所立不成過也。(4b1-2 = 437a7-8)

Furthermore, according to [the theory of] pseudo-examples, [if the visual faculty is used in this antinomic inference as a positive example (*sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*, Ch. *tongyu* 同喻), this inference] will also incur the fault that what is to be proven is not established for (not accepted by) the opponent (Mahāyāna scholars) as one of the two parties [in the debate with regard to this positive example].

In Source 1, Wengui not only introduces the same antinomic inference, as the one which was mistakenly ascribed to Sun'gyōng by Kuiji and later ascribed to Wōnhyo by Zenju,¹² but also offers a criticism of it. Because Wengui clearly stands on the opposite side of the antinomic inference, this antinomic inference did not reflect Wengui's own innovative thoughts but was an inference that had already existed and known to him from some unclear sources.

If Zenju's ascription of this inference to Wōnhyo is correct, we know further from Source 1 that Wōnhyo's antinomic inference had already arrived in China during the composition of ZYS, because the YLSGS in which Source 1 is located is the last part of ZYS. According to Shen (2008, 4), ZYS must be composed between 649–655.¹³ Kuiji¹⁴ reports that the antinomic inference arrived in China during the Qianfeng 乾封 era (666–668) after Xuanzang's death in 664. However, if the above dating of the composition

of ZYS is correct, Wŏnhyo's antinomic inference would have arrived in China at a much earlier time before 655. In this light, Kuiji's report seems unreliable.

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in his YMDS, Kuiji's criticism of the antinomic inference¹⁵ immediately follows his exposition of Xuanzang's inference.¹⁶ In contrast, Wengui's exposition of Xuanzang's inference is located in the first volume of ZYS. Wengui's criticism of the antinomic inference (Source 1) is found in the last part of ZYS, the YLSGS. This last part is devoted to an extensive exploration of the theory of *jāti* (false rejoinder) in Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the former part of ZYS, to which belongs Wengui's exposition of Xuanzang's inference, and the last part of ZYS, to which belongs his criticism of the antinomic inference, were written separately. It is possible that the antinomic inference came to China after the former part of ZYS had already been completed and circulating among his contemporaries at around 655, so that Wengui had to insert his criticism of it (Source 1) in the last part of ZYS which was written at a later time.¹⁷ If this was the case, it is possible that Wŏnhyo's inference came to China during the Qianfeng era after Xuanzang's death, just as reported by Kuiji.

At any rate, Wengui's criticism of the antinomic inference seems much earlier than Kuiji's criticism of the same inference. Kuiji's criticism of the antinomic inference is divided into six objections. The main point of his criticism is that part of the reason-statement of this inference, that "[the visual form that is well established] is not included in visual consciousness" (*yanshi bu she* 眼識不攝),¹⁸ is not accepted by Mahāyāna scholars. This is because being not included in visual consciousness is considered by Kuiji to be equivalent to the property of being separate from visual consciousness. However, that the visual form that is well established is separate from visual consciousness is rightly what is to be proven. Any statement which is equivalent to what is to be proven cannot be used in the reason-statement of an inference. All these thoughts are not found in Source 1. However, Kuiji has based his fourth objection to the antinomic inference on Wengui's criticism of this inference. The fourth objection by Kuiji is as follows:

Moreover, the positive example will also incur [the fault that] what is to be proven is not established [with regard to it] (i.e. not accepted by Mahāyāna to be

present in it). This is because according to Mahāyāna, the visual faculty is not certainly separate from visual consciousness. Because the faculty is the cause [and] consciousness is the result, they are neither certainly identical with nor separate. Furthermore, the cognition of achieving the task [even includes] the visual faculty in [its] universal apprehension. [Only] an object distant [in time] as a condition [for the rise of consciousness] (i.e. things-in-themselves as the manifestation of seeds in the storehouse-consciousness [*ālayavijñāna*]) can be said to be certainly separate from the apprehending visual consciousness.¹⁹

In addition to Wengui's criticism in Source 1, Kuiji in his fourth objection mentions the causality between the visual faculty and visual consciousness as an evidence for their relation of being neither identical with nor separate from each other. However, Kuiji does not mention Wengui's criticism in Source 1(5) that the reason of the antinomic inference is inconclusive because it is uncommon to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. He only repeats Wengui's criticism in Source 1(6) that what is to be proven is not established with regard to the positive example of this inference.

The main point of Wengui's criticism is that the visual faculty (*dhātu* no. 1) does not constitute a *sapakṣa* member of the antinomic inference. It fails to be accepted by both sides, in a debate, to have exhibited the property to be proven with regard to this inference. Namely, it is not accepted by Mahāyāna scholars to be separate from visual consciousness. In order to show this, Wengui gives two special cases in the Mahāyāna doctrine. The first case is of a bodhisattva who arrives at the eighth stage (*bhūmi*) or above. A bodhisattva of this kind will obtain the supernatural ability to use one of his six forms of consciousness (or five sense faculties) in place of another.²⁰ The second case is of the Buddha who attains through the transformation of the first five forms of consciousness the "cognition of achieving the task," the purified cognitive ability to accomplish all the needed tasks. The Buddha, with this purified ability, is cognizant of everything by way of any of the first five sense faculties.²¹ In both cases, visual consciousness is allowed to be cognizant of the visual faculty. As being the object of visual consciousness, the visual faculty, according to the Yogācāra idealist stance, becomes an appearance manifested by visual consciousness and is not separate from the latter. In Source 1(4), Wengui emphasizes that the visual faculty remains the same regardless of its being cognized by whatever cognitive activity. It is the same visual faculty (*dhātu*

no. 1) that the author of the antinomic inference includes in the *sapakṣa* realm of this inference and is now proclaimed by Wengui to be not in the *sapakṣa* realm of this inference.

If the visual faculty does not constitute a *sapakṣa* member of the antinomic inference, no *sapakṣa* member of this inference will exhibit the reason “being either *dhātu* no. 1 or no. 2.”²² Therefore, Wengui explains in Source 1(5) that the reason of this inference is not present in *sapakṣa* (*shi tongpin wu* 是同品無). Because the reason is also not present in *vipakṣa*,²³ this reason is inconclusive because it is uncommon to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. As additionally said in Source 1(6), if the visual faculty is used in the antinomic inference as a positive example,²⁴ this positive example will incur the fault that what is to be proven cannot be established with regard to it. That is because the opponent (Mahāyāna scholars) as one of the two parties in the debate does not accept that the visual faculty is really separate from visual consciousness. Clearly, Wengui is on the opposite side of the antinomic inference.

Wŏnhyo's Response: Texts

Source 2 (IDS 520c26–521a4):

(1) 文軌師云：因明道理，於共比量，自法、他法皆得不定。以自在眼識所變眼根之影作不定過。(520c26–28)

Master Wengui says: According to the principles of *hetuvidyā*, either things (*dharmā*) [that only] we [accept] or things [that only] others (our opponents) [accept] can be used [as counterexamples] to an inference [for] both, in order to reveal its inconclusiveness. Hence, the visual faculty that is an image manifested by the unimpeded visual consciousness can be used [as an example] to reveal the fault of inconclusiveness [incurred by an inference for both].²⁵

(2) 然判者云：改即無過。「真故極成色，離極成眼識」，便無不定，極成眼識不緣眼故。(520c28–521a1)

However, the author of *P'an* [*piryang non*] (Wŏnhyo) says: No fault will be incurred [by the antinomic inference], if changes are made [to it]. [Namely, the fault of] inconclusive [reason] will not be incurred, [if the thesis of this inference is reformulated as follows]:

From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is separate from the visual consciousness that is well

established.²⁶

[This is] because the visual consciousness that is well established does not apprehend the visual sense (i.e. the visual faculty).

(3) 以自許佛有漏色，於前共量，他作不定，便改因云「自許極成初三攝」等。如無漏色，耳識等緣，雖離眼識，而非極成初三攝故，不成不定。(521a1-4)²⁷

Source 2 belongs to a long passage in Zōshun's 藏俊 (1104–1180) *Inmyō daishō shō* 因明大疏抄 (IDS 520b3–521a12). This long passage is cited by Zōshun from T'aehyōn's 太賢 (fl. 735–744) lost work titled *Kojōkki* 古迹記. In this passage, T'aehyōn cites the discussions on the inference of consciousness-only by various scholars. Most of the materials are cited with more or less changes and cannot be regarded as the original wording of the cited authors (Tang 2018, 189, n. 133). Immediately after his citation of Wengui's views (Source 2[1]), T'aehyōn writes, "However, the author of *P'an* says," and begins a new citation (Source 2[2]–[3]). Because the Sinograph *ran* 然 is usually used to introduce a contrasting statement, we know that what is said in Source 2(2)–(3) is regarded by T'aehyōn as a response to Wengui's views outlined in Source 2(1).

However, to whom this *panzhe* 判者, as mentioned by T'aehyōn, refers is unclear.²⁸ In this regard, the following Source 3 which contains a PPRN fragment will prove helpful. For the convenience of cross-referencing, Source 3 is collated with parallel passages. The context in which this PPRN fragment is cited by Zenju is also given, with the fragment and its translation in bold lettering. In my view, this fragment reflects Wōnhyo's response to Wengui's criticism of the antinomic inference in its most complete form that we have today.²⁹

Source 3 (IRMS 322b15–322c10 = IDS 528a12–b8):

(1) 極成之色，離於眼識，是一向離，以之爲宗。根之與識，不即不離，以之爲喻。不即不離眼根，何成一向離宗？故喻中有所立不成。(322b15–18)

(2) 此因位中，尚眼根喻，所立不成。況果位中，成所作智通緣眼根。疎所緣緣與能緣識，豈定相離？自在位智，通緣本質，即爲相分。^a 如此眼根，是初三攝。此則大乘不許眼根定離眼識。此之眼根，望自雖爲同品，望他則是異品。以無共同品故，是同品無。以眼識爲異品，於彼亦無。此因於同、異品，既遍非有，則六不定中不共不定收。^c 非但喻有所立不成，因中亦有不共不定。(322b18–26)

(3) 曉師《判》云：此通未盡。^b 若對五根實互用宗，則應立言：「真故極成色，

離極成眼識。自許初三攝，眼識不攝故。猶如眼根。」若作是難，亦離不定。以大乘宗極成眼識必不緣眼故，此眼根爲共同品。識不攝因，於此定有。極成眼識，爲其異品，於彼遍無。故非不定，能作敵量。←^b若←^c以自許佛有漏色，於前共量，他作不定，便改因云「自許極成初三攝」等。如無漏色，耳識等緣，雖離眼識，而非極成初三攝故，不成不定。←^c (322b26–c7)

(4) 此《判》非也。雖改因云「自許極成初三攝」等，而「眼識不攝」言，大乘不許。若唯識門中，色即眼識攝。大乘不許極成之色眼識不攝。是故因有隨一不成。(322c7–10)

Parallel passages: ←^a Ce'e ZYS 4.4a6–b1 = YLSGS 437a2–7 (with coinciding parts underlined, see Source 1[4]–[5]): 如此相分眼根，並是初三之中眼根所攝。此則大乘不許眼根定離眼識。此之眼根，望自雖是同品，望他即是異品。然無共同品故，是本品無。以眼識爲異品，因復非有。此「自許初三攝、眼識不攝」因，於同、異品，既遍非有，即六不定中不共不定也。

←^b Ci IRMS 317a7–14 (see also IDS 522b7–13): 曉法師《判比量》中簡小乘所作決定相違過云...已上. Ri IDS 520c28–521a1 (see Source 2[2]): 然判者云：改即無過。「真故極成色，離極成眼識」，便無不定，極成眼識不緣眼故。

←^c Ci IDS 521a1–4 (immediately after Ri IDS 520c28–521a1, see above b – b and Source 2[3]).

Translation: (1) The visual form that is well established is [claimed in the antinomic inference to be] separate from visual consciousness [such that the former] is absolutely separate [from the latter]. [The visual form that is well established] is [now] used as the subject of the [antinomic] inference. [However,] the [visual] faculty is [actually] neither identical with nor separate from [visual] consciousness. [The visual faculty] is [now] used as a [positive] example [of the antinomic inference]. How can the visual faculty that is neither identical with nor separate from [visual consciousness be adduced in order to] establish a subject of inference that is absolutely separate [from visual consciousness]? Therefore, the [positive] example [of the antinomic inference] will incur [the fault that] what is to be proven is not established [with regard to it].

(2) [On the one hand,] in the case of the causal state [of Buddhist practice], what is to be proven is not established with regard to this [positive] example, i.e. the visual faculty. Furthermore, in the case of the resultant state [of Buddhist practice, enlightenment], the cognition of achieving the task [can even include] the visual faculty in [its] universal apprehension. [On the other hand,] how can an object distant [in time] as a condition [for the rise of consciousness] (things-in-themselves as the manifestation of seeds in the storehouse-consciousness) be certainly separate

from the apprehending visual consciousness? The cognition [of a bodhisattva who is] in the state of [possessing] unimpeded [abilities can even include] the original form [of things (i.e. things-in-themselves)] in [its] universal apprehension, with [the original form of things] becoming exactly the appearance-aspect. ^a → [Both of] the above [two] forms of visual faculty [that are apprehended by the cognition of achieving the task and by the unimpeded cognitive ability respectively] are included in [the category of visual faculty in] the first three [*dhātus*]. Therefore, that the visual faculty is certainly separate from visual consciousness is not accepted by Mahāyāna [scholars].³⁰ [Hence,] the visual faculty in this case (the antinomic inference), although being [a] *sapakṣa* [member] with respect to themselves (Hīnayāna scholars), is indeed [a] *vipakṣa* [member] with respect to others (Mahāyāna scholars). [However,] because there is no *sapakṣa* [member] that is equally [accepted],³¹ [the reason of the antinomic inference] is not present in *sapakṣa*. [Furthermore,] visual consciousness is used as *vipakṣa* [in the antinomic inference]. [The reason is] also not present in it. This reason (being not included in visual consciousness, although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept) is present neither in *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*. Hence, [the reason] is included in [the category of inconclusive reason which is] inconclusive because it is uncommon [to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*] in [the classification of] the six inconclusive [reasons].³² ← ^a Not only the [positive] example [of the antinomic inference] incurs [the fault that] what is to be proven is not established [with regard to it], but the reason [of this inference] also incurs [the fault that it is] inconclusive because it is uncommon [to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*].

(3) The *P'an* [*piryang non*] of Master Wŏnhyo explains: This explanation is incomplete. ^b → If [I am] confronted with [the opponent's] doctrine that the five sense faculties can actually be used in place of another,³³ then [I] shall set forth [the following inference] that:

[Thesis:] From the standpoint of ultimate truth, the visual form that is well established is separate from the visual consciousness that is well established (眞故極成色, 離極成眼識).

[Reason:] Because, although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that we accept, [it] is not included in visual consciousness (自許初三攝, 眼識不攝故).

[Example:] [This is] like the visual faculty (猶如眼根).³⁴

If [I] raise the above objection [to the inference of consciousness-only], [I] will be free from [the fault that my reason is] inconclusive. Because the visual

consciousness that is well established does not apprehend the visual sense (the visual faculty) in the Mahāyāna doctrine, this visual faculty can be [a] *sapakṣa* [member] that is equally [accepted]. The reason of “being not included in [visual] consciousness [although included in the first three *dhātus* that we accept],” is certainly present in this [*sapakṣa* member]. [Furthermore,] the visual consciousness that is well established constitutes the *vipakṣa* [in the above objection]. [The reason is] pervasively absent from it. Therefore, [my reason in the case of the above objection] is not inconclusive. [The above objection] can be an opposite inference [to the inference of consciousness-only]. ^{← b} If ^c → the opponent (Mahāyāna scholars) makes reference to the tainted form of the Buddha (佛有漏色), which we accept [on behalf of Hīnayāna], [as a counterexample] to the former inference [for] both (i.e. the antinomic inference) and reveal [the fault of] inconclusiveness [of its reason], then the reason [of the antinomic inference] should be changed [to the following form] that:

[Because,] although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established and that we accept, [the visual form that is well established is not included in visual consciousness].³⁵

For example, the untainted form (無漏色) [of the Buddha] is apprehended by auditory consciousness (耳識) and other [forms of consciousness other than visual consciousness when using one of the six forms of consciousness in place of another]. Although [the untainted form] is separate from visual consciousness [and constitutes a *vipakṣa* member of the inference of consciousness-only], [it] is not included in the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established [and hence does not exhibit the reason]. Therefore, [the fault of] inconclusiveness [in the reason of the inference of consciousness-only] will not be incurred [in this case, when a new qualification “being well established and that we accept,” instead of the qualification “that we accept,” is used to qualify the first three *dhātus* mentioned in this inference].^{← c}

(4) [To Wōnhyo's response, we say,] the *P'an* [*p'iryang non*] is incorrect. Although the reason [of the antinomic inference] has been changed to “although included in the first three [*dhātus*] that are well established and that we accept,” etc., the statement, that [the visual form that is well established] is not included in visual consciousness, is unaccepted by Mahāyāna [scholars]. From the standpoint of consciousness-only, the visual form is surely included in visual consciousness. The Mahāyāna [scholars] do not accept that the visual form, that is well established, is not included in visual consciousness. Therefore, the reason [of the antinomic inference] incurs [the fault of] not being established (i.e. not accepted) by


one of the two parties [of the debate, namely, Mahāyāna scholars].

Wōnhyo's Response: Interpretation

By comparing Source 2(2)–(3) with the PPRN fragment in Source 3(3), we know that Source 2(2) is a summary of the first half of this fragment (Source 3[3]^{b-b}), and Source 2(3) is an accurate citation of the second half of this fragment (Source 3[3]^{c-c}). Therefore, the *panzhe* as mentioned by T'aehyōn must refer to Wōnhyo, wherein *Panzhe* means “the author of *P'an* [*piryang non*].” In T'aehyōn's view, Wōnhyo's discussion in Source 2(2)–(3) constitutes a response to Wengui's argument in Source 2(1).

The context of Zenju's citation of this fragment (Source 3[3]) also indicates the relevance of the fragment to Wengui. Zenju's citation is located in his commentary on Kuiji's fourth objection to the antinomic inference.³⁶ In commenting on this objection, Zenju explains that the reason of this inference is inconclusive because it is uncommon to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. As noted in the above, this is exactly the point of Wengui's criticism on antinomic inference and this point is not shared by Kuiji. Moreover, when explaining the inconclusiveness of the reason of this inference (Source 3[2]^{a-a}), Zenju has used in a silent way materials from Wengui's criticism of this inference (Source 1[4]–[5]). After making use of the materials from Wengui Zenju comes to the conclusion that, not only the example, but also the reason of the antinomic inference is faulty. Zenju then introduces the above mentioned fragment from Wōnhyo (Source 3[3]) as a counter to the Wengui's criticism that the reason of the antinomic inference is inconclusive. After citing this fragment, Zenju offers a criticism of it (Source 3[4]). However, Zenju's criticism only repeats Kuiji's point that Mahāyāna scholars do not accept the claim that the visual form that is well established is not included in visual consciousness. Hence, in Zenju's view, Wōnhyo's fragment in Source 3(3) constitutes a response to Wengui's criticism of the antinomic inference, in Source 1(4)–(5) (≈ Source 3[2]^{a-a}).

The relation between all of the above mentioned passages can be summarized as follows.



[Figure 4] Wŏnhyo and Wengui


From the above figure, we can see that there remains two questions. Question 1 pertains to the source of T'aehyŏn's citation of Wengui's views (Source 2[1]). At first, because Source 2(2) is regarded by T'aehyŏn as a counter to Source 2(1) and Source 2(2) reveals Wŏnhyo's revision of his antinomic inference, Source 2(1) must have expressed some different views on the antinomic inference to which Source 2(2) had to counter.

As is cited by T'aehyŏn in Source 2(1), Wengui expresses the view that one can use an example which is only accepted by himself or by his opponent to reveal the inconclusiveness of the reason of the opponent's inference. The illustration given by Wengui to explain this is "the visual faculty that is an image manifested by the unimpeded visual consciousness." This is reminiscent of the "visual faculty [manifested in the consciousness] as an appearance-aspect" (相分眼根) as mentioned by Wengui in Source 1(4). Moreover, the "unimpeded visual consciousness" (自在眼識) mentioned in Source 2(1) is also reminiscent of the case of a "bodhisattva [with] unimpeded [abilities]" (自在菩薩) in Source 1(3). The "visual faculty that is an image manifested by the unimpeded visual consciousness" in Source 2(1) can be identified with the visual faculty that is apprehended by visual consciousness of a bodhisattva who is endowed with unimpeded abilities. It is one of the "two forms of visual faculty" claimed by Wengui in Source 1(4).

Furthermore, in Source 1(5), Wengui uses this form of visual faculty as an example to point out that the visual faculty does not belong in the *sapakṣa* group of the antinomic inference. Therefore, the reason in this inference is inconclusive insofar as there is no *sapakṣa* where this reason can reside. The

type of inconclusive reason that Wengui intends to reveal with respect to the antinomic inference is a reason which is inconclusive because it is uncommon to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*.

The type of inconclusive reason that Wengui revealed, as stated by T'aehyōn in Source 2(1), can be inferred from the type of inconclusive reason that Wōnhyo avoided, as was supposed by T'aehyōn in Source 2(2). In Source 2(2), Wōnhyo claims that “[the fault of] inconclusive [reason] will not be incurred” because “the visual consciousness that is well established does not apprehend the visual sense (i.e. the visual faculty).” The relation of the visual faculty to the visual consciousness that is well established and to the unimpeded visual consciousness can be illustrated as follows.



[Figure 5] Different concepts of visual consciousness

As is clear from the above illustration, the unimpeded visual consciousness does not fall in the category of the visual consciousness that is well established, because it is recognized as existing only by Mahāyāna scholars. The visual faculty, although being an object of the unimpeded visual consciousness and being not separate from it, is not an object of the visual consciousness that is well established, and is separate from this kind of visual consciousness. Hence, if the property to be proven in the antinomic inference is changed from the condition of being separate from visual consciousness to the condition of being separate from the visual consciousness that is well established, namely, if the

qualification “that is well established” is added to “visual consciousness,” then the visual faculty will certainly exhibit this qualified form of property to be proven, and remain in the *sapakṣa* realm of this inference.

Based on the above consideration, we can understand that the reformulation of the property to be proven in the antinomic inference, as done in Source 2(2), is meant to keep the visual faculty remaining in the *sapakṣa* realm of this inference so as not to incur the fault of inconclusive reason. Therefore, the type of inconclusive reason that Wōnhyo intends to avoid in Source 2(2) is rightly inconclusive because there is no *sapakṣa* for this reason to reside in, i.e. is of the *bugong buding* 不共不定³⁷ type. This must also be the type of inconclusive reason that Wengui has argued, as claimed by T'aehyōn in Source 2(1). Although the *bugong buding* type is a very special case in the list of six types of inconclusive reason, it is indeed one of them. Now, the type of inconclusive reason that Wengui has argued as stated by T'aehyōn in Source 2(1) can be identified as the same one that Wengui intended to reveal in Source 1(5).

Therefore, in Source 2(1) and in Source 1(3)–(5), Wengui makes reference to the same example, i.e. the visual faculty that is apprehended by the visual consciousness of a bodhisattva who is endowed with unimpeded abilities, with the aim of revealing in the same antinomic inference the same type of inconclusive reason. The source of T'aehyōn's citation of Wengui's views in Source 2(1) can be identified as Source 1(3)–(5). Source 2(1) must be T'aehyōn's summary of Wengui's criticism of the antinomic inference.

Question 2 pertains to the problem of whether Wengui's criticism of the antinomic inference was really known to Wōnhyo, and whether Wōnhyo indeed made a counter to it. Because Source 2(2) is only a summary of Wōnhyo's words, we now focus on his original wording as cited by Zenju in Source 3(3)^{b-b}.

Firstly, Source 3(3)^{b-b} is preceded by Wōnhyo's judgment that “this explanation is incomplete” (*ci tong wei jin* 此通未盡).³⁸ There must be some statement of what this explanation refers to which comes before Wōnhyo's judgment in the complete version of PPRN. However, this supposedly existent statement does not survive today, because the middle part of Wōnhyo's discussion on the antinomic inference is not found in either manuscript form or direct citation in extant literature.³⁹ Zenju has not framed this supposed statement in his PPRN citation in Source 3(3). This is similar to Zenju's citation of PPRN on another occasion. In the extant but incomplete version of

PPRN, there is a discussion on Wengui's explanation of *viruddhāvvyabhicārin* (Ch. *xiangwei jue ding* 相違決定). On that occasion, Wōnhyo cites Wengui's explanation first and then gives his own analysis.⁴⁰ However, Zenju, when citing Wōnhyo's analysis, has abstracted Wōnhyo's citation of Wengui from the PPRN context, put it ahead of Wōnhyo's analysis, and marked it as a citation directly from Wengui.⁴¹ This treatment of the PPRN text makes the initial words of Wōnhyo's analysis "*ci zhong wen yi*" 此中間意 ("the intention of the question here") stated without a referent. Taking into account Zenju's decontextualization of the PPRN text, we cannot exclude the possibility that Zenju might have also abstracted Wōnhyo's citation of Wengui from the PPRN context, and has used the citation with some changes, as in Source 3(2)^{a-a} (\approx Source 1[4]–[5]). If this is the case, Source 3(2)^{a-a} might contain materials from Wōnhyo's citation of Wengui in PPRN. It is to this citation of Wengui that Wōnhyo lays the judgment "this explanation is incomplete."⁴²

Secondly, Wōnhyo's revision of his antinomic inference in Source 3(3)^{b-b} is based on the assumption that he is facing an opponent who holds to the doctrine that the five sense faculties can actually be used in place of another (五根實互用宗). This doctrine corresponds to the two special cases offered by Wengui, in Source 1(3).⁴³ In this light, Wōnhyo seems to have assumed Wengui to be his own opponent as can be noted in Source 3(3)^{b-b}.

Thirdly, Wengui, in Source 1(5), claims that "there is no *sapakṣa* [member] that is equally [accepted]" in the case of the antinomic inference. In contrast, Wōnhyo in Source 3(3)^{b-b} argues that the visual faculty "can be [a] *sapakṣa* [member] that is equally [accepted]," if the property to be proven of this inference is reformulated into being separate from the visual consciousness that is well established. Wengui's use of the concept "*sapakṣa* that is equally [accepted]" in his criticism of the antinomic inference was also known to Wōnhyo.

Fourthly, Wengui in Source 1(5) claims that the reason of the antinomic inference is not present in *sapakṣa*, because the visual faculty, although exhibiting the reason, is not a *sapakṣa* member. In contrast, Wōnhyo in Source 3(3)^{b-b} argues that the reason "is certainly present in this [*sapakṣa* member (i.e. the visual faculty)]" (*yu ci ding you* 於此定有), because the visual faculty will still be a *sapakṣa* member when the property to be proven of this inference is reformulated in the above mentioned manner. In this way, Wōnhyo sweeps away the fault that the reason is inconclusive because it is uncommon to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. This type of inconclusive reason is not only the main

ground of Wengui's refusal of the antinomic inference in Source 1, but is also the main problem that Wŏnhyo tries to resolve through his revision of this inference in Source 3(3)^{b-b}.

Therefore, knowledge of Wengui's criticism permeates all aspects of Wŏnhyo's argument in Source 3(3)^{b-b}. Taking into account T'aehyŏn and Zenju's recognition of the relevance of Wŏnhyo's defense of his inference to Wengui's criticism, we may conclude in a relatively safe manner that Wŏnhyo had a deep understanding of Wengui's criticism and has indeed worked out a response to Wengui in his PPRN.

In the final analysis, Source 2(3) (= Source 3(3)^{c-c}) seems to be Wŏnhyo's extended consideration about the direction the debate between the inference of consciousness-only and his antinomic inference will take on the presupposition that one of the six forms of consciousness can be used in place of another. However, there are no parallel discussions in the literature that can be used as evidence for any solid interpretation of this passage. The interpretation on which my translation of this passage is based is admittedly hypothetical.

Concluding Reflections

In the above pages, I have tried to demonstrate that,

- (1) The antinomic inference which was actually formulated by Wŏnhyo was known to Wengui. Wengui offered a criticism of it in the last part of ZYS, the YLSGS. The point of Wengui's criticism is that the reason of the antinomic inference is inconclusive because it is uncommon to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, based on the reason that the visual faculty (*dhātu* no. 1 in Figure 2) does not constitute a *sapakṣa* member of that inference. Wengui's criticism must be earlier than Kuiji's criticism of the same inference.
- (2) Although no evidence shows that Kuiji's criticism of the antinomic inference is known to Wŏnhyo, the latter knew Wengui's criticism of his inference and made a counter in his PPRN. The point of Wŏnhyo's response is that the fault of inconclusive reason as pointed out by Wengui can be avoided if the property to be proven in the antinomic inference is reformulated into the condition of being separate from the visual consciousness that is well established.

Related to this argument, I have tried to show another important fact, in Tang (2018, 154, 194–195), that,

(3) Wengui’s explanation of the inference of consciousness-only in the former part of ZYS is the source of Wōnhyo’s knowledge of this inference.

However, (2) and (3) appear to contradict each other. It seems chronologically impossible that the same ZYS was the source of Wōnhyo’s knowledge of the inference of consciousness-only and at the same time contained a criticism of Wōnhyo’s antinomic inference that can be written only after Wōnhyo has been acquainted with the inference of consciousness-only with the help of this same ZYS. Generally speaking, text *A* cannot contain a reference to text *B* when *B* can only take place in a later time than *A*.

The only possible way to solve this contradiction is to accept that the former part of ZYS must be composed at an earlier time, and thereafter the last part, the YLSGS, which contains the criticism of the antinomic inference. Therefore, I suggest the following chronology of the relationship between Wengui and Wōnhyo.

Xuanzang’s translation of <i>Nyāyamukha</i>	649	
		Composition of the former part of ZYS
Debate between Lü Cai and Xuanzang’s disciples	655	Spread of the former part of ZYS in Silla
Xuanzang’s death	664	Arrival of Wōnhyo’s antinomic inference in China
Kuiji’s criticism of the antinomic inference	666	Wengui’s criticism of the antinomic inference and the composition of the last part of ZYS, i.e. the YLSGS
	/	
	668	Spread of the last part of ZYS in Silla
	671	Wōnhyo’s response to Wengui and the composition of PPRN

[Figure 6] Chronology of the relationship between Wengui and Wōnhyo

Wengui composes the former part of ZYS between 649–655,⁴⁴ and at around 655 or at a later time, the former part of ZYS is spread to Silla and is studied by Wŏnhyo. Wŏnhyo then formulates the antinomic inference, which is sent to China probably with the help of some other scholars from Silla, such as Sun'gyŏng. Then, the antinomic inference arrives in China and becomes known to Wengui. When composing the YLSGS, Wengui offers a criticism of the antinomic inference.

Kuiji claims that the antinomic inference arrives in China during the Qianfeng era (666–668) and that he formulates a critique of it during that period (YMDS 347 = T 44, no. 1840, 116a20). However, Wengui's criticism of this same inference probably precedes Kuiji's critique. If Kuiji's report is correct at least to the point that his inquiry is made between the years 666–668, Wengui's criticism and the composition of the last part of ZYS must be no later than year 668.

This last part of ZYS must have arrived in Silla before 671, because it was in 671 that Wŏnhyo composed the PPRN (PPRN 953a17–18) and in it is composed a response to Wengui's criticism. However, a problem remains; the date of the arrival of the antinomic inference in China. Whether this inference arrives in China before or after Xuanzang's death (664) is still an open question.

Notes

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1 For newly found manuscripts related to this fragment, see Kim Young-suk (2017, 98–99), Okamoto (2018, 97) and Kim Sung-chul (2017, 219, 225, 228). Cf. n. 6.

2 For Wengui's life see Shen (2008, 3).

3 This passage is translated in Tang (2018, 165–170). See also Moro (2015, 99–105).

4 The Chinese *yin*, the corresponding Sanskrit *hetu*, and the English “reason” all have multiple meanings in the philosophical contexts. In this paper, I use “reason” consistently as a translation of *yin*. *Yin* in Buddhist logic could refer to either the second statement of a three-membered inference or the predicate in this statement. A three-membered inference runs as follows: Sound is impermanent (thesis), because it is produced (reason), like a pot (example). Both the statement “because it is produced” and the predicate “produced” in this statement are called “reason” (*yin*). In this paper, I use “reason” only in the sense of a predicate, except that I am presenting a complete inference. In certain context, in order to avoid ambiguity, I use “reason-statement” to refer to the reason in the sense of a statement.

5 YMDS 336 = T 44, no. 1840, 115b26–27. Translation is available in Tang (2018, 156). Franco (2004) clearly explains why the reason of Xuanzang's inference fulfills the three characteristics.

6 IRMS 321a19–21 (Ce PPRN fragment, cf. n. 1), translation is available in Tang (2018, 184).

7 In Buddhist logic, both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* could refer to either a certain group of things or being a member of this group. In the case of a three-membered inference for the thesis “sound is impermanent” (cf. n.4), *sapakṣa* could refer to either the group of impermanent things or pots, and *vipakṣa* could refer to either the group of permanent things or an atom, which is a member of this group. The subject, “sound” is *pakṣa*. Furthermore, I use “*sapakṣa* member” and “*vipakṣa* member” to refer to the elements that belong to the *sapakṣa* group and the *vipakṣa* group, respectively.

8 This is Wengui's version of the inference of consciousness-only. See ZYS 2.21b2–3 = ZYS MS 9–11, and cf. Tang (2018, 170; 173). Cf. n. 5 (Kuiji's version).

9 This is the same as Wōnhyo's antinomic inference. Cf. n. 6.

10 For the four categories of refutation, see ZYS 4.3a5–7 = YLSGS 436c8–10.

11 Strictly speaking, there is no *sādharmyadr̥ṣṭānta* (positive example: things exhibiting not only what is to be proven but also the reason) in the case of the antinomic inference

- according to Wengui's theory, although there is *sapakṣa* (similar instance: things exhibiting what is to be proven). The *dhātus* nos. 4–18 (see above Figure 2) are indeed the *sapakṣa* members of the antinomic inference, because they are accepted by both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna scholars to be certainly separate from visual consciousness.
- 12 See n. 1 and n. 3.
 - 13 The terminus post quem is based on the date when the *Nyāyamukha* by Dignāga is translated by Xuanzang (649), because throughout ZYS there are many quotations from Xuanzang's translation of *Nyāyamukha*. The terminus ante quem is based on the date of Lü Cai's 呂才 (600–665) disputation with Xuanzang's disciples on Buddhist logic, which happens in 655, because ZYS is one of the sources of Lü Cai's knowledge about Buddhist logic. The terminus ante quem given by Shen (2008, 4) is year 654. However, 655 is also acceptable.
 - 14 See YMDS 347 = T 44, no. 1840, 116a20.
 - 15 See YMDS 347–351 = T 44, no. 1840, 116a15–b11.
 - 16 See YMDS 336–345 = T 44, no. 1840, 115b21–116a15.
 - 17 Cf. n. 13. Lü Cai shows no knowledge of the *jāti* theory of *Nyāyamukha*, so it is possible that Wengui's exploration of *jāti* theory was written after 655.
 - 18 Cf. n. 6.
 - 19 YMDS 350 = T 44, no. 1840, 116b3–5, translation is available in Tang (2018, 168).
 - 20 See CWSL 21a9–11 and 26a25–26.
 - 21 See CWSL 56c21–29.
 - 22 Cf. Figure 3 above.
 - 23 Cf. Figure 3 above.
 - 24 Cf. n. 6.
 - 25 My translation of this passage in Tang (2018, 167, n. 70) is inaccurate because I was not aware that the inconclusiveness mentioned here is *bugong buding* 不共不定 (“inconclusive because it is uncommon [to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*]”).
 - 26 For the original expression of the thesis, see n. 6.
 - 27 For my translation of this passage, see Source 3(3)^{cc}. Source 2(3) and Source 3(3)^{cc} are the same.
 - 28 Cf. Moro's (2015, 119) translation of this passage, 然判者云: それを判定する者は.
 - 29 Kim Sung-chul (2017, 237–238) reconstructed the PPRN passages on the antinomic inference, on the basis of manuscripts and from Zenju's citations, which appears to be the first part of Wōnhyo's discussion on the antinomic inference. The fragment presented here is the last part of Wōnhyo's discussion. The middle part which unfortunately has not been found must contain more words from Wengui as cited by Wōnhyo.
 - 30 Cf. Source 1(4).
 - 31 See n. 11.
 - 32 Cf. Source 1(5).
 - 33 Cf. n. 20 and n. 21.

34 Cf. n. 6 and n. 26.

35 For the original expression of the reason of the antinomic inference, see n. 6.

36 See n. 19.

37 The equivalent in Sanskrit is *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*, translated as “inconclusive because [it] is uncommon [to *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*].” Cf. n. 25.

38 Cf. Moro’s (2015, 105) translation of this statement, 此通未盡: この[基の]解釈は不十分である.

39 Cf. n. 29.

40 PPRN 952b17–20: 文軌法師自作問答:「問: 具足三相, 應是正因. 何故此中, 而言不定? 答: 此疑未決, 不敢解之. 有通釋者, 隨而爲注。」(Ce ZYS 3.4a3–5) 此中間意, 立比量云...

41 IRMS 362c8–12: 然文軌師自問答云:「具足三相, 應是正因. 何故此中, 而言不定? 答: 此疑未決, 不敢解之. 有通釋者, 隨空爲注。」判比量云:「此中間意, 立比量云...」

42 Wōnhyo’s citation of Wengui’s criticism of the antinomic inference has recently been partially attested in the PPRN manuscript from Baikei’s collection 梅溪旧藏本, lines 2–5 (Okamoto 2018, 97; Kim Sung-chul 2017, 225, 228): 文軌法師通此難云: 此因不定, 故非為敵. 謂小乘宗自許眼根定離眼識. 若大乘宗自在菩薩六識互用, 眼識亦得緣彼眼根, 現其相分. 及成所作智, 亦緣眼根, 現眼相分. 如此眼根, 是... (Cee ZYS 4.4a3–6 = YLSGS 436c26–437a2; cf. Source 1[2]–[4] and Source 3[2])

43 The only difference is that Wōnhyo mentions the five sense faculties, while Wengui mentions the six forms of consciousness. Wōnhyo’s expression of this doctrine can be regarded as an improvement of Wengui’s expression, since the textual evidences only speak of the five sense faculties. Cf. n. 20 and n. 21.

44 Cf. n. 13.

Abbreviations

For the usage of the abbreviations, Ce, Ce', Ci, Ri, etc. used for the purposes of categorizing the relationship of the parts of the text to minor witnesses, cf. Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic eds. *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālmālavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Chapter 1, Part I. Beijing and Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House & Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2005, pp. lii–liv.

- CWSL *Cheng wei shi lun* 成唯識論. Dharmapāla et al. T 31, no. 1585.
 IDS Inmyō daisho shō 因明大疏抄. Zōshun 藏俊. T 68, no. 2271.
 IRMS *Inmyō ronsho myōtō shō* 因明論疏明燈抄. Zenju 善珠. T 68, no. 2270.
 PPRN *P'an p'iryang non* 判比量論. Wŏnhyo 元曉. X 53, no. 860.
 T *Taishō Shinsbū Daizōkyō* 大正新脩大藏經. Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai, 1924–1935.
 X *Shinsan Dai Nippon Zokuzōkyō* 卍新纂大日本續藏經. Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 1975–1989.
 YMDS *Yinming dasbu* 因明大疏 of Kuiji 窺基. In Zheng 2010; also *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏, T 44, no. 1840. (Reference made to both editions, separated by an equal mark [=]).
 YLSGS *Yinminglun limen shisi guolei shu* 因明論理門十四過類疏. Kuiji 窺基. *Jinzang guangshengsi ben* 金藏廣勝寺本. Reprinted in *Zhonghua dazangjing (Hanwen bufen)* 中華大藏經(漢文部分), vol. 99, no. 1880, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996, 436–442.
 ZYS *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* 因明入正理論疏 (abbr. *Zhuangyan shu* 莊嚴疏). Wengui 文軌. Nanjing: Zhina neixue yuan, 1934.
 ZYS MS Dunhuang manuscript of ZYS. In Shen (2008: 218–229 [text] and 230–239 [plates]).

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