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New Discoveries in Wŏnhyo's *P'an piryang non*: Focusing on the *Akebono* Fragmentary Text and Fragments Found in Auction Catalogues

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Abstract

In early 2018 I happened upon three distinct images that were previously unknown fragmentary texts found as entries that were published in three separate Japanese auction catalogues. This article is a careful analysis of these fragmentary texts, which I conclude are excerpts from Wŏnhyo's P'an piryang non (Critical Discussions on Inference) that together make-up a section of the manuscript.

In the three entries, common characteristics including boundary lines, height and width of the lines, the calligraphic style, the content of discussions, and ink markings indicate connections between the cut-out fragments of passages. Furthermore, the content shows a continuity in the flow of Wŏnhyo's critique on the inferences posed by the Dharmapāla that refuted the past and future true existences.

The significance of this discovery is that we are able to piece together what had long been considered lost. The particular significance of Wŏnhyo's P'an piryang non is that it highlights the level of debate that took place in East Asian Buddhism. In the middle of this, Wŏnhyo was a prolific writer who was read by both the Japanese and Chinese monks, of whom we can piece together the person and his system of thought with the works that are extant and newly-discovered. The current discovery is important as it is part of one of his most outstanding work.

Key words: *P'an piryang non, Critical Discussions of Inference, Dharmapāla, past and future true existence, Bhāvaviveka, emptiness-existence debate*

Introduction

Wŏnhyo's (617–686) *P'an piryang non* 判比量論, or *Critical Discussions on Inference*, is partially extant where only 162 lines are currently known.¹ Though it is a small portion, the significance of what exists becomes evident from the uniqueness of its composition, the depth of its analysis, and the notable influence it had in the history of East Asian Buddhism. Especially the current continuation into the study of the *Critical Discussions on Inference* (hereafter *Critical Discussions*), after the conclusion of a 1969 report on the discovery of the Sanil copy gives reason for an encouraging outlook for further developments in the research of Wŏnhyo's widely-known composition. Given a series of new discoveries, together with the revived interest in the extant literature written by Wŏnhyo, great progress has been made in our understanding of its underlying thought and uniqueness.²

Preparing a presentation on Wŏnhyo's manuscript fragments, I realized that there were undiscovered fragmentary texts of the *Critical Discussions* to be found in catalogues of old manuscripts, and this has led me to continue my search.³ In 2018, between January and March, I happened upon three entries that were previously unknown images of fragmentary texts. These are the entries in the 1) *Kodenseki Sitami Tenkan Dainyūsatsukai Mokuroku* 古典籍下見展観大入札会目録 (hereafter *Kodenseki Catalogue*),⁴ 2) the *Kobitsutekagami taisei* Vol. 6 古筆手鑑大成,⁵ and the 3) *Kōsetsusai Yamauchisi Dainikai · Momiyama Uzusi jōhin Nyūsatsu Mokuroku* 香雪齋山内氏第二回糺山髻華氏藏品入札目録.⁶ I analyze these fragmentary texts and present my findings, which indicate that these texts are parts of the same copy of Wŏnhyo's *Critical Discussions*, and furthermore, are closely connected texts.⁷

The three fragments were all discovered by examining Japanese catalogues of old texts, consisting of collections of photoprints of pre-modern fragmentary texts. On examining various characteristics of the fragments, I found that the newly-discovered texts are parts of Wŏnhyo's not fully extant composition, *Critical Discussions*. Despite the limitation of examining photoprints of the texts in question, close examination of the bibliographical elements and exegetical evidence supports my suspicion of the identity of these fragments. What is even more pressing is they are found to be interconnecting verses that have become separated and sold in fragmentary form.

A brief summary of the evidence from the three entries includes such

characteristics as boundary lines, the height and width of the lines, calligraphic style, the content of discussions, and ink markings that indicate connections between the cut-out passages of the fragments. Furthermore, the content shows a continuity in the flow of argument of Wŏnhyo's critique on the inferences posed by Dharmapāla (ca. 6th century) that refuted the past and future true existences,⁸ which are arguments that are contained in the *Dasheng guang bai lun shi lun* 大乘廣百論釋論.

The content of the newly-discovered fragments shows unity and cohesion in the ideas that were evident in the fragments from which we are able to conjecture some of Wŏnhyo's assertions. Such arguments are also found in Wŏnhyo's manuscript fragment that is currently in the private possession of Hiroshi Ochiai 落合博志, which has previously been verified as part of the *Critical Discussions*. Concurring arguments were also found in the other discovered fragments, and on several occasions, the same phraseology was found to be common between the different fragments.

Of particular note regarding the content of the discourse of the fragment is the emptiness-existence debate which seem to be the underlying point of discourse within the extant fragments. Furthermore it is worth noting that despite the fact that the texts were relatively short and the arrangement of the fragments is somewhat unclear, it can be verified that the arguments of the fallacy "wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants" 所別不極成過 and the fallacy of "being unfounded" 所依不成過, which are contained in Bhāvaviveka's (ca. 490–570) "inference of not truly ultimate" 非真勝義比量, were also the main points of discussion in Wŏnhyo's harmonizing inquiry found in his *Critical Discussions*. I now turn to the three fragmentary texts.

Bibliographical Analysis

The fragmentary text found in the *Kodenseki Catalogue*

Figure 1 is the image of the three lines (hereafter Kodenseki text) that was published in the *Kodenseki Catalogue*, a collection of entry fragments that were auctioned off in 1987 by the Tokyo Kodenkai (Tokyo Association of Classics, 東京古典会). Although no bibliographical information was included on this

future worlds¹¹ that is refuted by Dharmapāla (ca. 6th century). However, this fragmentary text and the *Akebono* fragmentary text are related to the four lines in the latter part of the Hiroshi Ochiai text. Nonetheless, it is judged that these two fragmentary texts, the *Akebono* and Hiroshi Ochiai texts, are both parts of the current fifth verse. This will be further discussed in the third section of this article below.

Based on the previously discussed characteristics of line height, line width, calligraphic style, number of characters per line, and the grammatical syntax, we can indeed presume that the fragmentary text in discussion belong together with the previously verified fragmentary texts as parts of the *Critical Discussions*. Furthermore, if we were to expand our bibliographical examination techniques, including the quality of the paper and radio-carbon dating,¹² we could be more assured that the Kodenseki text belongs to the same manuscript as *Akebono* and Hiroshi fragmentary texts.

There are also supplementary details that are unique to the current fragmentary text. First, the length of the fragment is about 25.3 centimeters long based on the known dimensions of the *Akebono* fragmentary text.¹³ If we compare this to previous verified fragmentary texts, we can realize that the top and bottom margins are slightly narrower. Second, on the top right hand corner is the name “Kōbō Daishi” 弘法大師 and right below this in smaller characters, “five protective dharmas” 五護法. Below this is a seal with the logographs for the name “Kotoyama” 琴山, which can be translated as “zither mountain.” This is an indication that Kohitsu Ryōi (古筆了意, 1751–1834), the owner of the seal, has read the composition and has added his seal of approval. The more important point here is that the famous Shingon monk Kōbō Daishi (Kūkai 空海, 774–835) was the traditionally recognized author, but this attribution has since been rejected by mainstream academia as a misattribution for he was not the author of the *Critical Discussions*.

Finally, as noted, part of the fragmentary text is a direct citation from the *Dasheng guang*. This citation other than a single logograph “se” 世 in the first line which becomes “essence of the past world/time” 過去世體 instead of “essence of the past” 過去體, is a verbatim citation.¹⁴

Akebono Fragmentary Text


The *Kohitsutekagami taisei* 古筆手鑑大成, published between 1983 to 1995, is a

collection of photoprints, totaling sixteen volumes, in which many old Japanese handbooks have been assembled. The sixth volume, which was published in 1986, is based on materials housed at the Umezawa kinen-kan 梅沢記念館 (Umezawa memorial hall), contains a photoprint of the handbook *Akebono* あけぼの. This text contains a photoprint consisting of five lines that appeared to be a fragmentary text of the *Critical Discussions* (figure 2, hereafter *Akebono* text). The following discussion is based on figure 2 and information regarding this fragment.

As mentioned earlier, the height of the character lines is 21.4 cm and its line width is 1.7 cm. Similar to the Kodenseki fragmentary text, the height and width of the lines are the same as those of the previously verified fragmentary copies such as the Otani University text.

Again, the text is written with the same cursive script and the number of characters contained per line are twenty/twenty/nineteen/twenty/nineteen, starting from the first to the fifth line, which was also the case for the previously verified fragmentary texts. In this text, there does not appear a logograph at the beginning of the verse that indicates the verse number neither another logograph that indicates the length of a verse, that comes at the end of the verse.¹⁵ Presuming that this text is a continuation of the Kodenseki text, such markers of the verse number and the length of the verse is not expected since the markers come either at the beginning and at the end and the given text is the middle part of the verse.

This text also contains citations from the *Dasbeng guang*,¹⁶ a fact also consistent with the understanding that this text is a continuation of the Kodenseki text. Given the described characteristics together with the presumption that the current fragmentary text is a continuation of the Kodenseki text, we can be more assured that the current text was part along with other fragmentary texts to the *Critical Discussions*. Similar to the discussion of the Kodenseki text, if we were to add other examinations to this and other fragment texts, the result would strengthen this claim. The additional



[Figure 2]

examination would include analysis of the characteristics of the paper and hand-written editing.

Unique to this fragmentary text are the margins where given that the full length of this fragment is 25.3 centimeters, when compared to other fragments, the top and bottom margins are narrower. Also, on the very top right-hand corner, the name “Kōbō Daishi” 弘法大師 appears, which indicates that the manuscript was at some point mistakenly attributed to the famous Shingon monk, no different from the case of the Kodenseki text.

Moreover, given that this fragmentary text is a citation from the *Dasheng guang*, we should note that there are many mistaken characters within the fragmentary text where a total of fourteen miswritten logographs exist.¹⁷ If the miswritten parts were corrected then we have the following from line one to the fifth.

- ① 不名現有非現在故所立比量便立已成此義不然
- ② 汝立三世一切時有如所執空故名現有非現在攝
- ③ 名爲現有故我比量非立已成若言去來體是現
- ④ 有世所攝故猶如現在理亦不然汝許去來用非現
- ⑤ 有是世所攝則所立量有不定過若言去來體是

When we compare the text from where it was cited in the *Dasheng guang*, we find the following: first line, eighteenth character *ũi* 義 was in place of *i* 理; second line, nineteenth character *chae* 在 was in place of *se* 世; forth line, thirteenth character *yōn* 然 was in place of *song* 成; Fifth line, thirteenth character *kwa* 過 replaced *sil* 失. Even with these exchanges, and considering the overall content, the message is not altered by the miswritten logographs. Moreover, the author of this fragment appears to have summarized a portion of the *Dasheng guang* that is 108 characters long into thirty-two characters—starting from the beginning of the second line *yō rip* 汝立 and ending with *i sōng* 已成 in the mid-part of the third line.


The *Kōsetsusai Yamauchisi Dainikai* – *Momiyama Uzusi jōhin Nyūsatsu Catalogue* Fragmentary Text

In the catalogue of an antique auction organized by the Tokyo Art Club 東京美術俱樂部, which took place in 1927, the *Kōsetsusai Yamauchisi Dainikai* –

Momiyama Uzusi jōhin Nyūsatsu Catalogue, that the third presumed fragmentary text of the *Critical Discussions* appears (Figure 3, hereafter *Kōsetsusai* text). Takayuki Kojima (2012, 65) asserts that it is a fragment from the *Critical Discussions* but his work was not a detailed examination. Based on this photoprint, I will analyze the evidence to further determine that this piece was part of the *Critical Discussions*.

First, this fragmentary text is written in the same cursive form with three lines of twenty/twenty/nineteen characters in length. This accords with the previously discussed bibliographical characteristics of the other fragmentary texts of the *Critical Discussions*. At the beginning of the verse there is no indication of the verse number and no indication at the end of the text indicating the total number of characters within the verse. This tells us that it is fragment from a mid-section of a verse.

In particular, this text has not been mentioned in other sources as possibly a lost fragment of the *Critical Discussions*. However, it contains subject matter known to be addressed in the *Critical Discussions*. This fragment also discusses matters that are referenced in the *Yuishiki bunryōketsu* 唯識分量決 and the *Shōchin ryōdō* 掌珍量準, the emptiness-existence debate, which is also treated in the *Critical Discussions*. As an aside, these two treatises maintain the position that there is no difference between the two claims of Bhāvaviveka (ca. 490–570) and Dharmapāla (ca. 6th cen.) about emptiness and existence.¹⁸ Moreover, if we consider the calligraphic style, the number of characters per line, and the guiding lines in-between the lines, it is very possible that this fragment was part of the discussed fragments. If at a later time several points were to be examined more closely, a more adequate judgement will be possible. Not only the height and width of the lines of this text but, as noted earlier, the characteristics of the paper, added edits, and stamped seals would need to be analyzed as well. Nonetheless, there are unique points regarding the margins of this fragmentary text. First, the bottom margin in comparison to the top margin is wider and even when compared to the other bottom margins of the



[Figure 3]

above discussed fragmentary texts.

A clearer identity of this fragment can be had once the texts previous to and after the current text is examined. Second, on the very top right-hand corner, the name “Kōbō Daishi” 弘法大師 is written, and below this is a seal with the characters for “Kotoyama” 琴山 similar to the two previously discussed fragments.

As in the previous fragments, note that the characters in this current fragment are also miswritten. Takayuki Kojima has pointed out six places where logographs are miswritten.¹⁹ After correcting the characters we would have the following as the text for the Kōsetsusai text:

- ① 實有真如自不許故亦有所依不成因過解云此中
- ② 有法約彼所執雖不許實而許所執故無有法不成
- ③ 宗過以所立法非真勝義唯是遮故亦無所依不

The mistakes were most likely made in the process of copying the text; similar logographs were mistaken by the scribe. Although the visible codicological characteristics have been described, I now turn to the content of the discourse and try to make the case for uniformity in Wōnhyo’s presumed argument.

Analysis of the Content of the Fragmentary Texts

The Kodenseki Text and Akebono Text: Critique of Dharmapāla’s Refutation of “Past and Future True Existence”

As discussed earlier, the three lines in the Kodenseki text was the starting part that presumably connected with the five lines of the Akebono text. Here I examine the two fragmentary texts in a working combined and translated form as follows:

Fifth [verse]

The Bodhisattva Dharmapāla explains the following in refuting the claims of the Sarvāstivāda School about the two worlds (世):²⁰

(Thesis) The essence of the dharma of the past world is ultimately not manifestly existing (現有).

(Reason) Because it is said they have already become extinguished and because it is included in the past world.

(Example) It is like functioning (用) in the past world.

(Thesis) The essence of the dharma in the future world does not manifestly exist either.

(Reason) Because it is said that it has not yet occurred, and because it is included in the future world.

(Example) It is like functioning in the future world.

Although the essence of the dharmas in past and future worlds do exist, it is said to not manifestly exist. That is because it is not in the present world. It follows that if you claim that the inference that is established merely establishes what had already been formed, then this claim is not valid. The three worlds that you have established exist at all times.

I said manifestly existing because your argument is like being attached to voidness, not because they were included in the present world. So, my demonstration was not the reestablishing of what had already been formed.

If you claim that,

“(Thesis) The essence of dharmas in the past and future worlds are in the present.

(Reason) Because they are included in the world.

(Example) Like the substance of dharmas in the present world,” this is not logical either.

If the functions in the past and future worlds that you acknowledge are not in the present but included in the worlds, there will be a fallacy of inconclusiveness (不定過) in the your demonstration.

If you claim that,

“(Thesis) The essence of dharmas in the past and future worlds are...”

This is a description of Dharmapāla's claim which is also from the “Refuting the Age” chapter (Poshi-pin 破時品) of the *Dasheng guang*. It is, in essence, a clause-by-clause logical refutation of the Sarvāstivāda School's claims about the past and future true existence. In reference to the “Refuting the Age” chapter of what has been refuted here by Wŏnhyo, we find the following: 1) Dharmapāla's first inference, 2) Dharmapāla's second inference, 3) Sarvāstivāda School's refutation, 4) Dharmapāla's repeated critique, 5) Sarvāstivāda School's

first inference, 6) Dharmapāla's critique, 7) Sarvāstivāda School's second inference, 8) Dharmapāla's critique, 9) Sarvāstivāda School's third inference, 10) Dharmapāla's critique, and 11) Dharmapāla's summary.²¹

However, because Wōnhyo's refutation, which appears in the fragmentary text, only discusses the claims made in the subsections 1) through 6) and parts of 7) of the "Refuting the Age" chapter, we are aware that Wōnhyo engages directly with Dharmapāla's arguments; but it is difficult to determine how much of Dharmapāla's ideas Wōnhyo accepted.²² Furthermore, we can safely assume that the above discussion would be followed by a critical assessment, but the detailed character of such analysis, unfortunately, cannot be determined given the material at hand. At the least, we can discern that Dharmapāla's postulations on the true existence of the past and present worlds were one of the main issues that Wōnhyo grappled with in the *Critical Discussions*.

Aside from the discourse, the textual connections of the given eight lines consisting of 159 characters in the two fragmentary texts show that it is the front section of the fifth verse. Furthermore, a comparative analysis with the four lines²³ from the backside of the fragmentary text of Hiroshi Ochiai show the content of the four lines to be a continuation of the subject matter. The Hiroshi Ochiai fragmentary text coincidentally contains Wōnhyo's critical discussion of Dharmapāla's critique found in the "Refuting the Age" chapter, as discussed in the above.²⁴ For this reason, the Hiroshi Ochiai fragmentary text is worth discussing at this point. Also, because this text contains a debate on the inferences of Dharmapāla's refutation, it is worthy of closer examination.²⁵

...already [existing] and future [existence] are true existence. In that case, what (the Sarvāstivāda School) has established as truly existing in the past and future worlds (no. 9 in the above) is free from the error of establishing what is already determined, similar to [what was refuted by Dharmapāla] earlier. It is all the more harming oneself. Therefore, this will bring about one of the two errors.

"As previously stated [by the Sarvāstivāda School], "In the past and future worlds what has been described as truly existing (no. 7 in the above) does not distinguish between manifestly existing 現有 and already existing 曾有. For this reason, it is establishing what is already determined." If this is claimed, then [I would] denote that "because it is manifestly existing there is nothing harmful to oneself."

The remaining inference is revealed to be an inference of a corresponding

debater. Because the text is self-evident, there is no need to analyze it.

《Seven Inferences》


Within the argument presented in this text, the “that already [existing] and future [existence] are true existence.” is a discourse on the existence of all things that is based on ultimate truth 勝義諦, not mundane truth 世俗諦, and is estimated to be a writing that takes into account the states of already existing and future existence. Namely, the already existing and future existence are methods of existence in the past and future worlds that need to be understood in distinguished states of truths. It is also a claim that already existing and future existence can describe truly existing phenomenon while such descriptions cannot be applied to the non-truly existing phenomenon.²⁶ However, Dharmapāla accepts that the past and the future worlds are recognized as “already existing” and “future existence” only within mundane truth, and not ultimate truth.

Wŏnhyo, on the other hand, claims that the two states are based on a different form of understanding, and explains that Dharmapāla's critique (no. 10 in the above), “both sides are already in full agreement” 相符極成過 which resides in the ninth inference (no. 9 in the above) when depending on mundane truth, is not correct. In following, Wŏnhyo claims that the ninth inference, comes to aim for either “a reason that is contradictory (to another reason that the proponent accepts)” 相違決定不定過 or the “fallacy of a reason that is contradictory due to its differences with the premise” 法差別相違過, which preclude that “both sides are already in full agreement” 相符極成過.

Also, Wŏnhyo, regarding these mutual sides to be already in full agreement, brings into discussion the seven inferences and introduces Dharmapāla's position and points out the fallacies. If the discussed past and future worlds investigated in the inferences signify the existence of things as already existing and existence to come in the future, then it is a presumption that there can be a critique that both sides are already in full agreement, as put forth by Dharmapāla who recognizes that in mundane truths such existences can truly exist. However the discourse on the existence of all things appears in the fifth inference, and because it is argued that the essence of the dharma through the processes of encountering conditions/objects 攀緣, it is manifestly existing.²⁷ Wŏnhyo, by arguing that there is no error that would be harmful, effectively disputes Dharmapāla's position.

Following this line of argument, another point of conjecture can be made. It starts with the idea that the sixth verse that is in possession of Hiroshi Ochiai (Figure 4), needs to be re-examined, namely because there is a sense of a disruption in the flow of thought at the beginning of the Hiroshi Ochiai text. In other words, the content of the text that follows the character “six” 六, which indicates the beginning of the sixth verse, seems to be out of place. After carefully analyzing the front and the aft sections, the two seem mistakenly interchanged.

Figure 4 is a magnified view of a comparison between a portion of the text from the first line (counting from left to right) and a portion from the latter two lines, lines eight and nine. Though lines eight and nine are located in the latter section, it is conjectured that they need to be placed before the first line. We can verify this with a visible ink mark in the text that joins lines eight and nine to line one. The mark is a thin ink marking that appears to be from a loose hair from the writing brush. This mark starts from the logograph *kūm* 今, which is the second character in the cut-out magnified portion in figure 1, and on the eighth line. This mark continues to the character *cha* 自 of the ninth line, half-way down the line and ends at the character *sōp* 攝, which is



[Figure 4]

on the first line. In the magnified frame, this same character is the second character in cursive form on the third line. From this we can know that portions from the Hiroshi Ochiai text were rearranged in an incorrect order. We can also verify that the two lines, eight and nine, are part of the fifth verse that come after the combined Kodenseki and Akebono texts that makes-up the beginning part.

Based on this conjecture, the Kodenseki text, Akebono text and the Hiroshi Ochiai fragmentary texts together consist of the following:

- 7) Sarvastivāda School's second inference,
- 8) Dharmapāla's critique,
- 9) Sarvastivāda School's third inference,
- 10) Dharmapāla's critique.

Here we can discern some of Wŏnhyo's critical discussions that connect together with Hiroshi Ochiai text. Though we can obtain a semblance of the overall flow of the argumentation, detailed description of Wŏnhyo's thoughts beyond the conjectural will elude us until we are able to construct the full text of the *Critical Discussions*. Because the total number of seven inferences were said to be addressed in the fifth verse, other than the inferences 1), 2), 5), 7), 9) which appear in the "Refuting the Age" chapter, we can only wait until the lost portions of the *Critical Discussions* are discovered when we can have an exact idea of the remaining two inferences.

Kōsetsusai Text and the Reconciliation of the Emptiness-Existence Debate

Though the three lines of the Kōsetsusai text may not be without flaws, it can be referenced for the notions of the true existence of Suchness and the truly ultimate that were raised for discussion in this text. From the text at hand we can conjecture about the inference of the emptiness of unconditioned phenomena that appears in the *Mahāyānahastaratna-sāstra*. Though the *Critical Discussions*, which addresses this debate, covers only one aspect of the debate, we can clearly discern that Wŏnhyo considers there to be no difference between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla's arguments.²⁸ In light of this, when we consider the claims contained in the Kōsetsusai text, we can estimate that the description of the inference proposed by the two logicians—the

interpretation that the two inferences do not mutually contradict—and the reconciliation of side issues would have been developed in this verse.

Among these, this fragmentary text is the section that reconciles the fact that there exists in an inference both the “fallacy wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants” 所別不極成過 and the “fallacy of being unfounded” 所依不成過. The particular inference that is being inquired is the “inference of not truly ultimate” 非眞勝義比量, which was a proposition put forth by Bhāvaviveka in an attempt to critique the Suchness that is claimed by “associated exegetes” (相應論師).²⁹ According to these exegetes, when Suchness comes to depend on ultimate truth, the position of truly existing is asserted, because even emptiness is the object of the perception of non-discriminating cognition. However, the Suchness that Bhāvaviveka is referring to is bereft of all attachment, but because it is tentatively established, it is established as empty, and not true existence, on the basis of ultimate truth.³⁰

Moreover, though non-discriminating cognition 無分別智 is an important function that allows one to have insight into ultimate truth, it is recognized only in mundane truth, but in ultimate truth it is neither subjective perception nor does it have an object of perception.³¹ In following, it was Bhāvaviveka’s establishment of an inference that the associated exegetes’ Suchness, in connection to the non-discriminating cognition, cannot be truly ultimate.

The portion of the content regarding Wōnhyo’s reconciliation of the inquiry of the “fallacy wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants” and the “fallacy of being unfounded,” contained in the “inference of not truly ultimate,” is indeed also discussed in the Kōsetsusai text as described.

(Question): ...[The associated exegetes recognize] Suchness through true existence, but since [Bhāvaviveka] does not accept this, it is a fallacy wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants.

(Exegesis): Here, the subject, based on the arguments of [Bhāvaviveka], is not recognized as true existence. However, because it is accepted as having been claimed by [associated exegetes], there is no fault in the thesis that the subject is not accepted. Because the predicate, “is not genuinely ultimate” but merely is a form of negation, there is no fallacy of being unfounded.

First, let us investigate the fact that there is no “fallacy wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants” in the thesis. The issue

here is that Suchness as the subject that was understood by the associated exegetes as true existence, and in the case of Bhāvaviveka that was understood in terms of not truly existing, means that the subject does not apply equally to both cases. However, Wengui (文軌, ca. 7th cen.) goes further and argues regarding the subject that, though applying a conditional limit of recognition, it was only an expression of his own recognition and that because to that because it does not express the opponent's recognition, it is argued that there is a "fallacy wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants."³² This principle will be the same in the reasoning for others. On this note, it is also very possible that Wŏnhyo has brooded over the claims of Wengui and has introduced this kind of inquiry.

If this were so, in such inquiry, because the Suchness of the inference is recognized as argued by the opponents, it is explained that there is no fallacy wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants. This means that there is no fault because it is reasoning for others that accepts Suchness as the subject where Suchness is that which is claimed by the associated exegetes. In this way, the explanation that the fallacy "wherein that which is being specified is not agreed upon by the disputants" does not exist by establishing the condition that the claim is made "by the person" within the thesis that is based on the reasoning for others is no different from Kuiji (632-682)'s argument.³³

Secondly, let's examine the fact that there is no fallacy of being unfounded in the reason. The issue here is that to the exegetes, even though the Suchness of true existence is recognized as the object of perception, there is no foundation for the reason in the Bhāvaviveka's argument because Suchness, a support for the object of perception, is not truly existing. Wengui, with regard to this issue, explained that the Sāṃkhya explained to the disciples of the Buddha that: "The ātman that I recognize is truly existing. That is because it is the foundation for *guṇa*." Having said this implied that it fall into the fallacy of being unfounded, because there is no foundation for the reason in the position of disciples of the Buddha.³⁴

Wŏnhyo responded to this and explained that "not truly ultimate" is merely a negation and not an affirmation and that is why there is not such fault. The thesis of the inference of not truly ultimate, is only to block the Suchness that the associated exegetes asserted to be genuinely ultimate and was not a claim in support of the exegetes' Suchness, which is not the truly ultimate. In this

way it is merely to block the assertions of the opposition, and the thesis, that do not give support, is referred to as meaningless thesis 無義宗. However, the reason of the inference is accepted by both Bhāvaviveka and the associated exegetes and examples, such as form 色, become the object of perception and at the same time include the intention of blocking the idea that it is not an object of perception, and that is why it is meaningful reason 有義因. Eventually, there is no fallacy of being unfounded in the inference for others when meaningful reason happens to depend on meaningless thesis, this is Wōnhyo's view.

Wōnhyo's address of this situation is somewhat unique in that among other logicians such as Wengui or Kuiji 窺基 (632–682), there is no direct discussion about such a case when a meaningful reason is dependent on meaningless thesis. Rather, Wengui and Kuiji explain that meaningless reason depends on meaningful thesis and meaningless thesis, and moreover that meaningful reason only depends on meaningful thesis and not on meaningless thesis.³⁵ There is however a Chinese logician, Huizhao 慧沼 (651–714), who, similar to Wōnhyo, clearly maintains the position that there is no fallacy.³⁶

Nevertheless, we can come to agree that through the three stages of inference we can come to perceive that Wōnhyo understood there to be no logical fault in Bhāvaviveka's inference of not truly ultimate. Furthermore, although Wōnhyo's analysis of the inquiry deviates from Wengui's, we can verify that the method of analysis shares commonalities with that of Kuiji and Huizhao.

Conclusion

Up to now, these three newly-discovered fragmentary texts have been analyzed and were found to be part of the same manuscript as the previously discovered fragmentary texts. Through an investigation of these newly-discovered fragmentary texts, I have come to the conclusion that the codicological characteristics and exegetical analysis strongly indicates the new fragments to be part of the manuscript texts that are housed at Otani University and the fragmentary text in possession of Hiroshi Ochiai. Based on these findings, adding a total of eleven lines of the newly-discovered fragments increases the total existing lines to 173 lines from the previous 162 lines, about a 7 percent increase in the text. It is all the more fascinating to come across the new

discoveries that came about starting from about 1912 of the *Critical Discussions* that was long considered to be lost.

Finally, through an analysis of the content of the newly-discovered fragmentary texts, we can determine that Dharmapāla's postulations on the true existence of the past and present worlds was one of the main issues that Wŏnhyo grappled with in the *Critical Discussions* and through which he engaged with the monks across Asia in a long-distance debate.

Notes

- 1 Up to the time of the current article, a total of 162 lines of fragments from the same manuscript has thus far been discovered. About 41 lines of fragments not included in this 162 lines of fragments have been found to be contained in variously scattered fragments. So far it has been estimated that the total lines that make up the *Critical Discussions* has been estimated to be 867 lines by Fukihara Shoshin (1967, 5) and 873 lines by Kim (2003, 33–35). Through the discovery of the three fragments, about 19.9 percent of the *Critical Discussions on Inference* has come to be reconstructed and there remains much to be discovered and textually analyzed.
- 2 Research on the *Critical Discussions* have been base on the following materials: 1) Hiroshi Ochiai 落合博志 owned (2005, 9 lines), 2) published in the *Ryōshichō* 梁紙帖 (2017, 7 lines), currently at Gotoh Art Museum 五島美術館, 3) published in the *Takamatsuchō* 高松帖 (2017, 15 lines), currently at Mitsui Memorial Museum 三井記念美術館, 4) Umetani 梅溪 old obscure manuscript (舊藏本) (2017, 5 lines), 5) published in the *Gōsen* 毫戰 (2017, 5 lines), currently at Tokyo National Museum 東京國立博物館.
- 3 See Kim (2017, 93–115).
- 4 Tokyo Kodenkai (1987, 258).
- 5 Kohitsutekagami Taisei henshūinkai (1986, 133).
- 6 Tokyo Art Club (1927, No.2). Other than the three discussed in the current article, a fragmentary text published in the *Kyōngjōl sugam* 經切手鑑 and housed at the Tokyo national Museum, also needs to be examined and compared to the other fragments, which will require another full-length article. The image of the *Kyōngjōl sugam* fragmentary text can be viewed at <http://webarchives.tnm.jp> (image no. C0083549).
- 7 Despite efforts to examine the actual physical copies of the fragments of the *Critical Discussions*, I am as of yet unsuccessful. The information that this article is based on is from already published photoprint sources. The most current location of the discussed fragments were not verified and may have been moved to a different location.
- 8 The word “past” and “future” do not simply refer to the meaning of the tense, but to (the essence) of the dharmas belonging to the past and future worlds.
- 9 These copies include the fragmentary text from Otani University or in the personal possession of Hiroshi Ochiai.
- 10 T 30 no. 1571, 214c.
- 11 The word “world” indicates a strong temporal dimension in that the Sinograph 世 is also often translated as “a period of time” or “an age.”
- 12 Such techniques are difficult given that only photo images were used. Of course, techniques such as radio-carbon dating to compare the fragments are needed for authentication and verification. Second, we can verify from the ink markings from the fragments of the Otani University, Hiroshi Ochiai, Gotoh Art Museum, and the Mitsui Memorial Museum that the writing tool was a horn pen. It is expected that this pattern

will also be found in this fragment. Lastly, on the Otani University text and Mitsui Memorial Museum fragment, there appears on the back side of the fragment a seal of the Empress Kōmyō (701–760) stamped tilted at a 45-degree angle. Such markings cannot be verified in figure 1 and therefore would need to verify from the actual fragmentary text.

- 13 The height of the fragments are as follows, Otani University, 27.4cm; Hiroshi Ochiai, 27.1cm; Gotoh Art Museum, 24.7cm; Mitsui Memorial Museum, 23.4cm; and the Umetani copy, 25.7cm.
- 14 The added logograph 世 is in brackets in the three lines of the Kodenseki text.
 - ① 五護法菩薩破薩婆多二世執云過去(世)體定非現有
 - ② 名已滅故過去攝故如過去用未來世體亦非現有
 - ③ 未生故未來攝故如未來用若言去來體雖是有
- 15 In the extant text of the *Critical Discussions*, a logograph indicating the order of the verse is written at the beginning of each verse and another at the end which indicates the total number of inferences in that verse.
- 16 The cited text can be verified in T 30, no. 1571, 214c.
- 17 First line, 2nd character (名 should be 即), 13th (便 should be 彼); second line, 11th character (執 should be 軌), 12th (空 should be 盡), 14th (名 should be 即); third line, 1st character (名 should be 即), 6th (我 should be 乘), 15th (去 should be 知), 16th (來 should be 成); fourth line 16th character (去 should be 知), 17th (來 should be 成); fifth line, 6th character (則 should be 即), 16th (去 should be 知), 17th (來 should be 成) (Kohitsutekagami Taisei henshū inkai 1986, 132).
- 18 See *Shōchin ryōdō* (T 65, no. 2258, 268a–b) and *Yuishiki bunryōketsu* (T 71, no. 2321, 449c).
- 19 Line one, fifth character (白 changed to 自); line one, seventh character (攝 changed to 許); line two, third character (轉 changed to 約); line two, ninth character (攝 changed to 許); line two, twelfth character (攝 changed to 許); third line, thirteenth character (口 changed to 遮) (Kojima Takayuki 2012, 65).
- 20 As explained in the endnote 10, the Sinograph, 世 translated here as “world” indicates a strong temporal dimension which can easily be translated as “a period of time” or “an age.”
- 21 T 30, no. 1571, 214c–215a.
- 22 Dharmapāla’s summary (no. 11) is also discussed in the text of the Mitsui Memorial Museum fragment. However, in that discussion, there is presented a testament of the acceptance of the reason, it has put forth examples and testimony of the claim of being free from the fallacy of either untruths 隨一不成過 (Kim 2017, 108–109). It follows that the Mitsui fragment and the fragment in discussion cannot be seen as being from the same passage.
- 23 National Institute of Japanese Literature (2005, 134–135).
- 24 Number 10 in the related discussions appears in the “Refuting the Age” chapter (Poshi

- pin) of the *Dasheng guang*.
- 25 Kim (2016, 287–290), claims from interpreting this fragment that “leaving aside the problem of ‘all phenomena in the three times (worlds) truly exist,’ the content here reflects the deciding factor that Wonhyo has interjected in the debate between the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda school.” However, I come to conclude that it is Wonhyo’s critique of the argument underlying Dharmapāla’s refutation that was debated in the *Dasheng guang bai lun shi lun*.
- 26 For instance, see T 29, no.1562, 626c.
- 27 For examples, see T 29, no. 1562, 598b, 626b–c, 628c.
- 28 Although the concrete content of how Wonhyo harmonized the two sides has not been found in the *Critical Discussions*, evidence of this is found in the *Shōchin ryōdō* (see n. 17). Also, in Wonhyo’s *Doctrinal Essentials of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* 大慧度經宗要 (HPC 1, no. 5, 480c–481a) and the *Reconciliation of Ten Problematic Issues* 十門和諍論 (HPC 1, no. 24, 838a–c) it is explained that the two arguments do not contradict the Buddhist canon and that being similar to the positions of existence and emptiness, accepting the two arguments does not create any contradiction.
- 29 It is argued in the *Mahāyānabastaratna-sāstra* that “[Thesis] Their Suchness is not truly ultimate. [Reason] It is because it is an object of perception. [Example] It is similar to matters.” 又彼真如非真勝義。是所緣故。猶如色等 (T 30, no. 1578, 274c).
- 30 T 30 no. 1578, 274b.
- 31 T 30 no. 1578, 274c.
- 32 It is argued in the *Mahāyānabastaratna-sāstra* that “[Thesis] Their Suchness is not truly ultimate. [Reason] It is because it is an object of perception. [Example] It is similar to color.” 又彼真如非真勝義。是所緣故。猶如色等 (T 30, no. 1578, 274c).
- 33 T 44, no.1840, 117b.
- 34 X 53, no. 848, 694a.
- 35 See Wengui’s *Commentary on the Introduction to Logic* (X 53, no. 848, 693c–694a) and Kuiji’s *Commentary on the Introduction to Logic* (T 44, no. 1840, 120c). However, these statements are not explained using the distinctions of inference for self 自比量, other 他比量, and both 共比量.
- 36 T 44, no. 1842, 173b.

Abbreviations

- HPC *Han'guk pulgyo chŏnsŏ* 韓國佛教全書 [Complete works of Korean Buddhism]. Comp. Han'guk pulgyo chŏnsŏ p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe 韓國佛教全書編纂委員會. Seoul: Tongguk taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 1979–[2000]. Available at Han'guk pulgyo chŏnsŏ retrieval system, http://ebti.dongguk.ac.kr/ebti/keyword/index_keyword.asp.
- T *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大藏經 [Revised Buddhist canon compiled during the Taishō reign period]. Eds. Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 and Watanabe Kaikyoku 渡邊海旭 et. al., 100 vols., Tokyo: Daizōkyōkai, 1924–1935.
- X *Shinsan Dainihon zokuzōkyō* 新纂大日本續藏經 [The new edition of the great Japanese supplemental canon]. Ed. Kokushokankokai 國書刊行會. Tokyo: Kokushokankokai, 1975–1989.

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